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ABSTRACT

MOVING BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL:
APPLYING CULTURAL IDENTITY TO STIGMA THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

May 2021

Emily Reichert, B.A., Penn State University
M.A., Purdue University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Associate Professor Reef Youngreen

Scholarly research on the topic of stigma has endured through half a century, formally
beginning in 1963 with Goffman’s influential work, “Stigma: Notes on the Management of
Spoiled Identity.” Since then, top researchers in a wide range of fields have contributed
toward further elucidating the expansive processes of stigmatization and anti-stigma
initiatives for a growing number of marginalized experiences. It is within this growing body
iv

of work, however, that inconsistencies and contradictions become more onerous and limit the
scope of future research. These limitations include a) competing camps of pro- and antistigma initiatives toward public health aims, b) siloed approaches to anti-stigma research, and
c) an overemphasis on individual- and psychological-level approaches at the expense of
cultural- and moral-level frameworks. The current project argues that in failing to prioritize
intersectionality, the field has expanded exponentially without means of translation in place.
This project represents an attempt to understand stigma with the lessons of intersectionality
in mind. In utilizing Stuart Hall’s Theory of Cultural Identity, stigma is reconceptualized as
both, a relationship between an attribute and a stereotype, and as a tool used within the
management of cultural identity values. Such a conceptualization is tested through two
research aims. The first explores the possible cultural role perceived danger may serve; the
second tests if a concept of verbal marks may play a role in stigma communication. These
aims are tested with a 2 x 2 x 2 experimental survey and distributed among undergraduate
college students who evaluate stigmatized, in the form of Schizophrenia and fatness, or nonstigmatized identities. Results showed that perceived danger likely does not play a significant
role in evaluation across stigma subjects, and that certain elements of positive evaluative
adjectives may be involved in a verbal marking process of stigma communication. The
findings of this study are discussed in terms of immediate and long-term implications, the
limitations that shaped the study, and recommendations for future research toward addressing
such limitations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1963 with the publication of Stigma: Notes on the Management of
Spoiled Identity by Erving Goffman, the concept of stigmatization, defined as the relationship
between a stereotype and an attribute, entered the public sphere. In the 56 years since then,
the subject of stigma has experienced a surge of public policy and academic attention
devoted to studying stigma experiences as well as researching stigma reduction strategy
methods and effectiveness. Within this history, the concept of stigma has undergone a series
of transformations meant to elucidate the many elements and processes involved according to
academic fields ranging from social and clinical psychology, sociology, and communication,
and many others. Said transformations include frameworks and models including the
Attribution Model of Mental Illness (Corrigan et al., 2003), the Model of Stigma
Communication (Smith, 2007), a Modified Labeling Theory (Link et al., 1989), and the more
recent Link and Phelan’s (2001) sociological umbrella concept of stigma. Within these
models, stigma is further classified according to where it is being measured such as public
stigma, self stigma, structural stigma, and stigma by association (Bos et al., 2013; P.
Corrigan, 2004; Goffman, 1963). In this way, knowledge about stigma in the last 50 years
has been wide-ranging and encompassing the expansive nature of the concept itself.
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Despite such a wide range in expertise all contributing to the subject of stigma and
stigma reduction, many questions and predicaments remain to be addressed. Some current
limitations involve a lack of coordination between researchers studying various stigmatized
topics such as in the case of health-related stigma (Stangl et al., 2019; van Brakel et al.,
2019) as well as issues with understanding where stigma fits within intersectional
frameworks (Remedios & Snyder, 2015). Other limitations include an uneven emphasis on
individual level factors of stigma compared to other factors such as moral and cultural
influences (A. Kleinman & Hall-Clifford, 2009; Yang, 2007; Yang et al., 2007). Lastly, there
is a disconnect and inconsistency in public health recommendations for stigma that vary
depending on the topic being discussed, as is evidenced in stigma related to mental illness,
body weight, and cigarette tobacco smoking policies (Abu-Odeh, 2014; Bayer, 2008; EvansPolce et al., 2015; A. Kleinman & Hall-Clifford, 2009; Puhl & Heuer, 2010; Stuber et al.,
2009). All of these limitations populate the field in which the current project resides. And
while there are many ideas proposals for possible solutions, many fall short of addressing
more than one limitation at a time.
As such, the current project brainstorms possible theoretical trajectories that may
offer viable solutions to the three limitations of stigma research. By going back to Goffman’s
(1963) original work and following recommendations from anthropological research
(Kleinman & Hall-Clifford, 2009; Yang et al., 2007), a proposal for stigma as informed by
Cultural Identity Theory (Du Gay et al., 1997; Hall, 1989) is put forward. In order to test the
viability of such a theoretical framework, two general aims derived from the theory are
proposed, each with testable hypotheses and research questions.
2

The following section will delve more deeply into the history of the field of stigma
research, the identified limitations of it, a proposal for stigma within Cultural Identity
Theory, and a delineation of the two main aims derived therein.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Summary of Existing Models and Frameworks
The subject of stigma has a single beginning in Erving Goffman with his 1963 book
entitled Stigma; Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. This work is documented as
the first attempt to unify a wide range of human experiences—including those such as
psychical disability, facial deformities, loss of anal sphincter control, and mental
hospitalization—under one single conceptual scheme based on what they shared in common:
that of stigma (Goffman, 1963, p. Preface). Although the origin of stigma is widely agreed
upon, the subsequent work following, ranging in contributions from disciplines such as
medicine, criminology, and psychology, have led to the subject quickly becoming
multifaceted and complex (Bos et al., 2013). A summary of prominent theories and
frameworks from various fields will be discussed in order to form a basis with which to begin
the current projects trajectory in stigma research.
Stigma is commonly conceptualized in terms of four dimensions that can be measured
including public stigma, self-stigma, stigma by association, and structural stigma (Bos et al.,
2013). These classifications originate in social psychological as well as clinical psychological
research and reflect researchers needs to distinguish between specific groups during survey
4

sampling. Public stigma represents those who are doing the stigmatizing and what their
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward the stigmatized manifest (Bos et al., 2013; Corrigan,
2004). Self-stigma represents the processes undergone by the person who has found
themselves to be stigmatized (Corrigan, 2004). The third component, stigma by association,
describes the processes that occur when a person finds themselves to be on the receiving end
of what Goffman (1963) termed a courtesy stigma, when a person receives a stigma because
they are associated with a person already stigmatized (1963, p. 2). Lastly, structural stigma
describes the institutionalization of what Goffman (1963) called stigma theories into societal
systems. These dimensions originate partially in response to the predicament of mental health
care in that the demonstrated improvement of effectiveness in treatment regimens over the
past 50 years is still being hindered by individuals not seeking help, in large part because of
factors such as stigma (Corrigan, 2004). Once these components of stigma are identified,
social psychological research then studies the various tracts, particularly public and selfstigma, to understand the cognitive and psychological mechanisms responsible for their
procurement.
One such social cognitive model addresses the development of public stigma, also
developed by Corrigan et al., (2003), called the Attribution Model of Mental Illness Stigma.
The model posits that discriminatory behavior is shaped by cognitive and emotional
attributions made by a person (Corrigan et al., 2003, pp. 164–165). Cognitive attributions of
controllability and dangerousness are the main drivers impacting beliefs about personal
responsibility, which then impact the affective or emotional response, and concludes in the
form of either discriminatory or helping behavior. The model informs the ways people
5

evaluate and emotionally react to stigmatized groups and demonstrates how attributions can
vary depending on whether the evaluator assigns cause and controllability in certain ways
(Corrigan et al., 2003).
Criticisms of social psychological models of stigma will typically note the lack of
attention paid to social influences of the stigma process. This gap has been addressed by
prominent sociologists, among them including Bruce Link and Jo Phelan, who attended to
the social constructivist aspects of the stigma process as well as structural. Their 2001 piece,
“Conceptualizing Stigma,” laid the groundwork for future interdisciplinary contributions and
highlighted current issues of how scholars at the time were researching stigma, including
inconsistent definitions, lack of representation of stigmatized individuals in theorizing, and
an overuse of individualistic focus. One of the solutions to these issues brought up was to
propose a new framework for the stigma concept that could be used across disciplines to
continue the study of stigma. What resulted was a definition of stigma intended to be more in
line with Goffman’s original intentions, where he states, “a language of relationships, not
attributes” is necessary to understand the process of stigma (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). Link and
Phelan’s definition consists of five interrelated concepts, the overarching point of which
being that stigmatization only occurs through the convergence of all five components (Link
& Phelan, 2001, p. 377).
Unique to Link and Phelan’s (2001) conceptualization is the acknowledgement of the
role of power in stigma as well. They state that this process of stigma is “entirely dependent
on social, economic, and political power—it takes power to stigmatize” (2001, p. 375). A
main justification for clarifying the dependence of stigma on power is to counter claims of
6

‘reverse-stigma,’ or the idea that stigmatization can be something created by powerless
groups about those who hold power over them. For Link and Phelan (2001), if the dynamic
of power in the situation is not parallel to the direction of the other four stigma components
of labeling, stereotyping, separating, and disadvantaging, then the social situation in question
is simply not that of stigmatization, but something else (2001, p. 376). They conclude, ‘To
the extent that we answer no, some of the cognitive components of stigma might be in place,
but what we generally mean by stigma would not exist” (Link & Phelan, 2001, p. 376). Of
the many contributions to the field that Link and Phelan’s (2001) framework adds, their
caveat of power is the first to integrate macro-level explanations of the stigmatization
process.
The remaining four components proceed as follows, first human differences are
distinguished and labeled. Link and Phelan (2001) explain that the amount of possible
differences between groups of people could quickly overwhelm even those who are most
observant. They acknowledge that only a select number of differences are made socially
significant, a process of which involves oversimplifying the situation as to result in clear,
unambiguous, and easily reproducible representations. Labeling is a term chosen by Link and
Phelan (2001) to describe this process, chosen over others such as ‘attribute,’ ‘condition,’ or
‘mark’ in an attempt to keep the focus on the stigmatizing process, rather than the object of
stigmatization (2001, p. 368). Second, the identified differences are associated with negative
attributes. The classical term for this component is known as stereotyping, which refers to the
various stories and expectations a society will circulate amongst itself in order to
institutionalize and reinforce the desired social dynamics of the time. The cognitive
7

advantage of stereotyping is understood in terms of ‘cognitive efficiency,’ whereby mental
processing can be preserved and saved for other tasks by reaching for an automatic prescripted stereotype in order to understand a given social situation. The third component
involves the separation of groups, the divide between ‘us,’ and ‘them,’ while the fourth
component is comprised of status loss and discrimination. The intent behind acknowledging
this fourth component is to draw attention not just to the process of stigma, but to its
outcomes and consequences as well.
Link and Phelan’s (2001) conceptual model of stigma breaks down the five
interrelated components that are all necessary for stigmatization to occur: labeling,
stereotyping, separation, and status loss and discrimination, all under the excise of power,
whether that power is political, economic, or social. The model brings together the various
definitions of stigma that exist within the literature and at the same time highlights why the
stigma predicament can be such a pervasive and persistent experience. One reason it is so
difficult to change is because of how multifaceted and complex the process is. The model has
been useful to subsequent stigma research in the years since. One expansion on the
components from Link and Phelan (2001) includes the Model of Stigma Communication
(Smith, 2007).
Although they appear similar, the Model of Stigma Communication, or MSC,
developed by Rachel Smith (2007), elaborates that operations of stigma are predicated on the
use of communicative tools. The MSC explicates the message attributes that are necessary
within stigma communication in order to enact those stigma processes. These four main
attributes include content cues for distinguishing people, categorization for separating people
8

into groups, linking the out-group to peril and danger, and the projection of responsibility and
blame away from the in-group and onto the out-group (2007, p. 463). According to Smith
(2007), these four messaging attributes lead to cognitive and emotional reactions, which then
lead to messaging effects such as developing a stigma attitude, isolation of the target, and
distributing the stigma message. Within the field of communication, further stigma research
is underway to address remaining gaps in the literature.
The Model of Stigma Management Communication (SMC), based in similar
principles to the Model of Stigma Communication (MSC), directly addresses the issue
among stigma research to question the determinations made in deciding whose perception
makes the determination as to whether an individual is stigmatized or not (Meisenbach,
2010). Such as in the case of concepts like public stigma and self stigma, Meisenbach (2010)
points out that the assumptions behind such concepts are based in the perceptions of nonstigmatized individuals. She states,
“SMC theory challenges assumptions that scholarly determination of stigma should
depend solely on non-stigmatized individuals’ perceptions. Individuals’ perceptions
of themselves as stigmatized are important identity formation and stigma
management theorizing, whether publics share that stigma perception or not”
(Meisenbach, 2010, p. 271).
By integrating research on ‘dirty work’ and occupational taint (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999;
Ashforth et al., 2007), Meisenbach (2010) proposes a 2x2 typology that details the strategic
options individuals have available to respond to stigma along two planes based on 1) the
acceptance or rejection of the public understanding of the stigma, and 2) the acceptance or
9

rejection of the stigma as it applies to the self. These four quadrants of stigma management
strategies therefor include six general approaches I) accepting, II) avoiding, III) evading
responsibility for, IV) reducing offensiveness of, V) denying, and VI) ignoring/displaying.
Of the many contributions the SMC adds to the field, it notably questions the discursive
dynamics of power that exist even within anti-stigma research in the form of what
perceptions of stigma are validated and established in conceptualization. SMC argues that
engagement with stigma is based on processes more complicated than a stigma and nonstigma binary and provides steps for understanding the paths of stigma management that
individuals face.
The previous models mentioned are but only a few of the many works published in
stigma research. Reviewing them serves the purpose of orientation to the wide array of
research that has followed the publication of Goffmans (1963) Stigma: Notes on the
Management of Spoiled Identity. The following section begins to address the limitations of
the current research and covers the existing recommendations of moving forward.

2.2 The Limitations of Stigma Research
The limitations of stigma research often appear small, but when considered
comprehensively, they compound to create a debilitating snowball effect. The first limitation
within the research is the inconsistent and contradictory practice of stigma processes that
appear to be subjectively based on the specific form a stigmatization takes. These
inconsistencies form two camps of pro-stigma and anti-stigma initiatives that for the most
part operate independently and in contradiction of one another. The resolution of these two
10

camps is further complicated by the multitude of limitations that are specific to anti-stigma
research, which include a siloed approach grounding current research and an overemphasis
on individual- and psychological-level approaches at the expense of cultural, social, and
moral frameworks. The source of these limitations is identified as an epistemological error in
failing to consider intersectionality in the conceptual development of stigma research. This
section will summarize these limitations in terms of how they relate to one another as well as
how they can be addressed by the proposed solutions in the following section. An overview
of the tension between pro- and anti-stigma camps will be discussed first.
In arguing that stigma can change over time, Kleinman and Hall-Clifford (2009) cite
two examples in depression and tobacco smoking stigma that have documented cultural
changes since the mid-1900’s. They note a significant de-stigmatization of depression, and
conversely a significant increase in stigmatization for tobacco smoking (Kleinman & HallClifford, 2009, p. 418). Interesting about these two examples is not only the opposite
directions of stigmatization, but also the difference in public policy approaches between the
two. This is interesting because the topic most associate with “stigma” is likely stigma
related to mental illness, and the anti-stigma approaches aimed towards reducing that form of
stigma. But restricting the concept only to as it pertains to mental illness misses much of the
stigmatization process, and this is especially clear in the case of other types of stigmas, such
as tobacco smoking and obesity. What emerges is something resembling a dichotomy, or
perhaps a spectrum, of pro - and anti-stigma-oriented topics. Here the term ‘pro-stigma’ will
be used to refer to health initiatives that support using strategies of stigmatization towards the
goal of decreasing certain behaviors, such as tobacco-cigarette smoking and fatness.
11

Conversely, the term ‘anti-stigma’ is used more frequently in the stigma literature and will be
used to refer to initiatives that aim to decrease stigmatization in service of goals towards
increasing certain behaviors, such as help-seeking for mental-illness.
Most significant about this duality is the level of contention behind those that qualify
as pro-stigma, such as in the case of obesity. Discussing the use of stigmatization within
weight-loss initiatives is a loaded task simply due to the cultural baggage that accompanies it.
Subjects such as the obesity crisis as well as the public health threat of obesity have been a
pervasive force for many decades in America and abroad (Brewis et al., 2018; Carr &
Friedman, 2005). More recently, health scholars are beginning to document what fat studies
advocates have long argued: that fat and overweight individuals experience interpersonal and
institutional bias and discrimination as a result of the stigmatization of fatness (Abu-Odeh,
2014; A. Brewis et al., 2018; A. A. Brewis et al., 2011; Carr & Friedman, 2005; Lyons, 2009;
Puhl & Heuer, 2010; Tomiyama et al., 2018). By using Link and Phelan’s (2001) multicomponent model of stigma, Abu-Odeh (2014) concludes that all five components necessary
for stigmatization to occur (1. Distinguish and label, 2. Link to undesirable beliefs and
stereotypes, 3. Separate in-group from out-group, 4. Status loss and discrimination, 5. Social,
economic, and political power) are present in public health initiatives to reduce obesity. If
both stigma and a health epidemic are a public health concern, it raises questions as to how
they should be reconciled.
Rekha Nath (2019) details in ‘The injustice of fat stigma,’ the possible reasons for
justifying the stigmatization of fatness do not withstand closer examination. The two most
common justifications for stigmatizing fatness include the consequentialist defense and the
12

desert-based defense (Nath, 2019). The consequentialist defense of fat stigma reasons that
due to the public danger posed by excess weight, social forces must be enacted to raise
awareness and deter people from gaining weight and to lose weight instead. The desert-based
defense of fat stigma argues that fatness is a social failure, one of which that implies those
who do fail by being fat are entirely responsible, and therefore blameworthy, for their failure.
Both of these justifications, Nath (2019) argues, are insufficient to justify the use of stigma
and therefore stigma should not be used toward either of these aims.
It is important to be clear that stigmatization of fatness is the primary tool being used
across these initiatives and that the strategy of fat stigmatization is not only an ineffective
tool for reducing obesity, it introduces additional threats to public health and health
disparities (Puhl & Heuer, 2010). This has implications not only for those impacted by fat
stigmatization, but also for the broader issue of interrogating the relationship between the
medical and public health fields with stigmatization as an adaptive public health strategy that
can be readily adapted across conditions. Fat body weight is not the only subject that has
utilized stigmatization towards improving public health.
In defending the use of stigmatization as a tool to impact public health against
obesity, bioethicist Daniel Callahan (2013) pulls from the success of similar public health
efforts to decrease another public health ailment: tobacco cigarette smoking. He argues that
through stigmatization, the campaigns combatting smoking were a public health triumph in
greatly reducing smoking among the population, therefore the same strategy should be
effective to address obesity as well. He is not incorrect to make this connection as it has been
outwardly acknowledged that stigmatization has been regarded an effective strategy for
13

reducing smoking, but this perspective is not without criticism (Bayer, 2008). Stigmatization
of tobacco smoking is cited for possible negative unintended consequences that are felt by
those who are the targets of smoking reduction campaigns (Evans-Polce et al., 2015; Stuber
et al., 2009). These unintended consequences can include feelings of guilt, loss of selfesteem, perceived devaluation, experiencing differential treatment, reports of keeping
smoking activity a secret, as well as withdrawal from nonsmoking peers (Evans-Polce et al.,
2015; Stuber et al., 2009). Similar to the critiques of the use of fat stigmatization as a public
health strategy, critiques of smoking stigmatization follow similar points: that the
consequences outweigh any possible benefits, that stigmatization inherently violates the
Hippocratic oath to do no harm, that stigmatization further compliments existing inequalities,
and that segregation in the form of ‘smoking islands’ may even encourage further smoking
instead of discourage (Bell et al., 2010; Graham, 2012; Thompson et al., 2007).
Considered together, obesity and tobacco smoking constitute two areas wherein
stigmatization is utilized proactively toward public health aims. While there are those who
disagree that stigmatization should be used as a public health strategy, these perspectives
represent the minority among a large consensus that are in favor of stigmatization being used
towards these goals. Contrast this with stigmatization related to mental illness, however, and
a different stance is taken in regard to stigma: here, mental illness stigma is considered
harmful, and several institutional bodies have invested in initiatives for stigma reduction, or
also called anti-stigma approaches.
Descriptive research about the effects and manifestations of mental illness stigma
exploded almost immediately in the late 20th century, work on stigma reduction took until
14

the recent 2010’s to begin seriously growing (Bos et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2017). Within the
United States, the Surgeon General released a 1999 report on mental health that was the first
of its kind to discuss mental health and mental illness (Hegner, 2000). Within it, both the
prevalence of mental disorders as well as the high cost of untreated illness were undergirded
by the significant role stigma plays both in negatively affecting people’s lives as well as
preventing them from seeking appropriate care (Hegner, 2000). The World Health
Organization followed suit and released a 2001 Mental Health report that addressed the
barrier of stigma and the need to reduce it. This report, following the 1999 White house
conference on mental health, jettisoned initiatives for stigma reduction efforts in the country
for the next decades to come. Indeed, the piece closes by drawing attention to World Health
Organization (2001) and Department of Health and Human Services (1999) reports of stigma
constituting the “leading impediment to health promotion, treatment, and support” (1999, p.
478).
In a landmark study by Corrigan and colleagues (2012), a meta-analysis was used to
evaluate the effects of anti-stigma approaches for mental illness. The study sample included
72 articles representing 79 independent studies that ranged from 1972 to 2010 (Corrigan et
al., 2012). Three approaches to changing public mental illness stigma were identified based
on social psychological research which included education, consumer contact, and protest
(2012, p. 963). Education approaches address inaccurate stereotypes of mental illness stigma
and counter them with factual information. Contact strategies involve introducing social
contact between intervention participants and stigmatized individuals. Lastly, protest
strategies draw attention to the injustice of stigma. These three approaches are then employed
15

to change three main outcome areas: attitudes, affect, and behavioral intentions. The findings
of the meta-analysis determined that both contact, and education approaches were observed
to significantly change attitudes and behavioral intentions. The analysis found that protest
strategy outcome effect did not differ significantly from zero, leading to the conclusion that
protest is not an effective method for stigma change. Similar findings were confirmed and
replicated in subsequent systematic reviews and meta-analyses that followed across a range
of stigma classifications including self-Stigma in a Chinese population (Xu et al., 2017),
interventions targeted towards workplace settings (Hanisch et al., 2016), long-term effects of
anti-stigma interventions (P. W. Corrigan & Penn, 2015), and stigma associated with
different forms of mental illness (Griffiths et al., 2014; Morgan et al., 2018).
The paradox with anti-stigma initiatives, however, is that despite institutional and
cultural agreement that stigmatization of mental illnesses is harmful, the effectiveness of
anti-stigma interventions suffers from several limitations. These include the heterogeneity in
type of stigma being measured, type of mental illness stigma being targeted, target
intervention audience, forms of outcomes measured, and length of effects following
interventions long term (Corrigan et al., 2012; Griffiths et al., 2014; Mehta et al., 2015).
As anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness stigma have grown, so have anti-stigma
research for other stigmatized subjects, particularly those related to health. However, instead
of the research about mental illness stigma being adapted and useful towards anti-stigma
research for other stigmatized health subjects, what has happened instead is the discovery
that the knowledge gained for mental illness stigma does not translate over to other forms of
stigmatization. This realization has led to the need for documentation into the ways in which
16

these stigmatized issues differ from mental illness stigma, and in the process, less attention
has been paid to the translatability of these findings. As a result, there is a large and growing
body of research as to the wide diversity of stigmatization. One review documented the
identification of 55 distinct scales that were being used to measure 136 outcomes all for
various forms of stigma (Mehta et al., 2015, p. 382). The consequence of this is that research
for anti-stigma initiatives are limited according to the stigmatized topic of interest, and
effectiveness of all these initiatives becomes difficult to discuss and quantify. Researchers
refer to this as a “siloed approach,” whereby the funding, theory, research, measures, and
initiatives are only specific to a single health condition (van Brakel et al., 2019). The siloed
approach is problematic for many issues, one of which being that when individual people are
considered, the realities of multiple stigmas become evident. This is problematic because, as
Turan et al. (2019) state, “While often examined in isolation, stigmatized identities do not
exist in a vacuum. Most people experience intersecting forms of stigma, which have complex
effects on health behaviors, physical health, and mental health” (2019, p. 12). Limiting
research in this way creates a dilemma for any anti-stigma or intervention efforts because the
singular focus is not best equipped to accommodate these complex effects.
To be sure, there is a substantial body of work devoted to studying the experiences of
those with multiple stigmas. Researchers such as Hartwell (2004), examine multiple stigmas
as they are applied to people, in this case examining racial, substance abuse, and mental
illness, and the ways in which these singular categories can form complex arrangements
when affixed to individuals. Similarly, Brinkley-Rubinstein’s (2015) work investigates the
effect of multiple stigmas through ethnographic interviews with formerly incarcerated, HIV17

positive, Black men. This study found that multiple forms of stigma compounded upon one
another, even though participants conceived of these stigmas separately. Remedios and
Snyder (2015) used survey responses to find that being afflicted with more than one stigma
category had the effect of multiplying the negative outcomes related to stigma such as unfair
treatment, being stereotyped, and feelings of invisibility. Similar conclusions were reached
by Logie and colleagues (2011) in their qualitative investigation into experiences of stigma
expressed by HIV-positive women, some of which with stigma related to sex work
occupations, sexuality, and/or gender. They found that the experience of discrimination and
stigma is overlapping, complex, and evident along micro-, meso-, and macro-level sites of
experience (Logie et al., 2011). The only problem with projects such as these is that there is
little initiative to further pursue such research to inform anti-stigma initiatives that address
multiple stigmas.
Work like that of Hartwell (2004), Brinkley-Rubinstein (2015), Remedios and Snyder
(2015), and Logie et al. (2011) also procures a second limitation that has not yet been
addressed, which is the dearth of collaboration between anti-stigma and research concerned
with forms of inequality such as racism, sexism, heterosexism, etc. (Holley et al., 2012).
Much of what is known about forms of oppression and social change has not been
incorporated into the mental health stigma research (Holley et al., 2012). While prevalent
stigma models recognize the role of social power to stigmatization, such is the case in Link
and Phelan’s (2001) conceptualization of stigma, that recognition does not get incorporated
into the methodological designs and instead the research remains affixed on examining
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individual, cognitive-level psychological processes over more critical perspectives (Holley et
al., 2012).
Increasingly across critiques of stigma and anti-stigma research is a frequent point
made about the imbalance between individual, psychological, and cognitive processes of
stigma in research compared to other forms of knowledge such as social, moral, and cultural
elements (Holley et al., 2012; A. Kleinman & Hall-Clifford, 2009, p. 418; Stangl et al.,
2019). Individual and psychological here refers to how researchers may study social aspects
of stigma such as stereotypes, environmental factors, and cultural norms, but that they only
do so in so far as they apply to the individual (Yang et al., 2007, p. 1526). Neglecting social
and cultural influences of stigma limits understanding the ways stigmatized illnesses are
interpreted by individuals and how those cultural forces can shape manifestations of stigma
in particular cultures (Yang, 2007, p. 981). Possible reasons why this is the case are less
speculated on, but one rational could be due to a conceptual quandary with the stigma
concept itself that gets brought to light when intersectionality is addressed.
Intersectionality, first discussed by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), is an element of
experience that describes group members that are multiply-burdened from multiple forms of
marginalization (1989, p. 140). Crenshaw (1989) centers the experiences of Black women in
order to illustrate the conceptual limitations of the single-categorical axis framework of
common conceptualizations of discrimination such as those present in antidiscrimination law
(1989, pp. 150–151). She refers to these conceptions as ‘top-down’ approaches to
discrimination that begin with normative understandings of ‘neutral’ individuals that then
applies marginalization as singular categories on the basis that they unidirectionally
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disadvantage compared to the normalized neutral state. The problem with this approach, she
states, is that it not only reinforces status quo norms of privileged group members, but it also
distorts a complex phenomenon into an oversimplified and exclusionary practice (Crenshaw,
1989, pp. 140; 149). In this way, she argues, Black women are excluded and erased in theory,
law, and anti-discrimination work based on the fact that they do not represent ‘pure’ unicategorical forms of discrimination as they pertain to the default and normal white male
identity because they are both Black and women (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 145).
Intersectionality creates a crisis for stigma research in the same way that it does for
antidiscrimination, except the dilemma may be more disastrous for stigma since it contributes
to a need for validating a stigma concept in the first place. Unfortunately, the interrogation of
stigma has already been under way and the additional interrogation that intersectionality
proposes threatens an already fragile field. This insecurity has always been present, as early
as in Goffman’s (1963) own work in which the final chapter of Stigma is devoted to
distinguishing the concept of stigma from that of deviance. They are not the same, he argues,
because deviance is too broad to address specific deviances that are institutionalized within a
society that constitute stigma (Goffman, 1963, pp. 131–132). It is on this basis that those who
find themselves stigmatized in different ways will still find themselves “in an appreciably
similar situation and respond in an appreciably similar way” (Goffman, 1963, p. 130). This
alone, however, did not completely resolve the issue of justifying the validity of the stigma
concept.
Again in 2008, Phelan et al. address the relationship between two similar concepts of
stigma and prejudice by reviewing 18 key conceptual models of stigma and prejudice to
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determine whether both concepts are studying the same or distinct processes (2008, p. 359).
They conclude stigma and prejudice are not distinct constructs and are rather two terms used
to describe the same process, with the caveat that they identified three ‘sub-types’ of
stigma/prejudice (Phelan et al., 2008, p. 365). For Phelan and colleagues (2008), the validity
of the stigma concept is maintained because they argue that stigma research addresses
specific elements of marginalization differently than discrimination research. This was a
conclusion that was not shared by Holley et al. (2012), that in a review of stigma and
oppression frameworks determine that the stigma concept is not sufficient recommended
replacing current stigma frameworks with a critical anti-oppression paradigm (Holley et al.,
2012, p. 60).
This vast collection of limitations appears overwhelming when considered together.
First, a division and lack of delineation between pro-stigma and anti-stigma initiatives
obscures larger questions of what role stigma should serve in a society, and why. Second,
research belonging to the anti-stigma camp has become hindered by a siloed approach that
grounds all research and efforts from the subject of stigmatization first. Third, the majority of
that research overemphasizes the influence of individual-level factors while neglecting to
study those related to morality and culture. A possible reason for all of these issues may have
to do with the conceptual validity of the stigma concept itself, something that has persistently
plagued the field since its inception with Goffman’s (1963) Stigma. At the center of this
epistemological crisis is the incompatibility between stigma frameworks and considerations
of intersectionality. It has become clear that if the stigma concept is to survive such scrutiny,
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it must be able to address the challenges posed by intersectionality in a manner that accounts
for the differences documented thus far.

2.3 Trajectory: Cultural Identity Theory
The current project proposes that a culturally based approach to studying stigma may
be a viable strategy toward maintaining a theoretically consistent understanding of
marginalization under the conceptual umbrella of stigma. In short, this project asks if cultural
perspectives of stigma will be as divergent and fragmented as individual-based research
findings. First, the assumptions and key principles of importance to a cultural identity
understanding of stigma will be reviewed. From there, two research questions are proposed
that represent possible ways a cultural identity conceptualization of stigma can make
meaningful intercategorical comparisons based on stigmatization status. The first research
question proposes that a form of discursive risk is shared among stigmatized experiences as
evidenced in a cultural situation of ‘identity stakes.’ The second research question asks if
symbolic, or verbal communicative, marks can be identified and measured in a way that also
makes meaningful intercategorical comparisons based on stigma status. The arguments
presented in each research question will lead to several hypotheses meant to test the viability
of each approach. Before the research questions are specified, however, the assumptions and
guiding framework of a cultural identity approach to stigma will be introduced.
In discussing the limitations of stigma research, the conceptual validity of the stigma
construct is brought to bear. Goffman (1963) begins this task and distinguishes stigma from
deviance, Phelan et al. (2008) delineate the differences between stigma and prejudice, and
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Holley et al. (2012) interrogate the distinction between stigma and oppression frameworks. A
notable conclusion drawn by Holley et al. (2012) is that stigma frameworks alone are not
sufficient for studying marginalization, and that anti-oppression based frameworks should
serve a significant role in rectifying that insufficiency. One possible approach, proposed by
scholars such as Bowleg (2012) and Turan et al. (2019), is the integration of the
intersectional framework proposed by Crenshaw (1989) with stigma to form the concept of
‘intersectional stigma.’
Turan et al. (2019) in their proposal of intersectional stigma, explain that there are
three main approaches to studying intersectionality within stigma. These include
anticategorical, intracategorical, and intercategorical (McCall, 2005; Turan et al., 2019).
First, the Anti-categorical approach works on deconstructing and interrogating existing
boundaries of categories to address the oversimplification of certain topics. Second, the
intracategorical approach takes the opposing route and delves deeply into a given category or
number of categories of identity. Third, the intercategorical approach facilitates comparisons
and similarities between groups and identities. These classifications are relevant because they
are the basis of which the stigma concept is justified as unique and necessary among
competing concepts for studying forms of marginalization. Goffman (1963) bases the
uniqueness of stigma on the basis that the litany of experiences he covers, including
criminality, sexuality, mental illness, unemployment, physical handicap, physical
unattractiveness, literacy, epilepsy, divorce, old age, obesity, colostomy, addiction, sex work,
race, deafness, blindness, polio, and religion, all share intercategorical similarities to
constitute the need of an umbrella concept of stigma.
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This is a justification that, when studied through siloed and overly individualistic
approaches, breaks down due to the abundance of descriptive and observable differences
between differing forms of stigmatization. And not to be mistaken, these anticategorical
observations are just as important in understanding the boundaries of the stigma concept.
Going too far and collapsing so many forms of discrimination into stigma threatens to flatten
and oversimplify a complex and multi-layered process. Yang and colleagues (2007) warn
that although stigma appears to be experienced globally across cultures,
“we must be careful not to collapse all forms of discrimination into a formulaic idea
of stigma. … Across cultures, the meanings, practices, and outcomes of stigma differ,
even where we find stigmatization to be a powerful and often preferred response to
illness, disability, and difference” (Yang et al., 2007, p. 1528).
The challenge of developing a concept of stigma that is informed by intersectionality must be
clear in the intercategorical similarities that justify their grouping under the stigma umbrella,
while also attending to the anticategorical factors that make these experiences complex. One
such strategy that may address these requirements and limitations is to shift from an
individualistic and psychological approaches into a cultural identity-based framework.
Anthropologists have made a compelling case in favor of such a direction. Kleinman
and Hall-Clifford (2009) return to Goffman in a reexamination of his oft cited work for clues
as to how he grounded the inclusion of stigmatized conditions. They state,
“The modern idea of stigma owes a great deal to Goffman, who viewed stigma as a
process based on the social construction of identity. In his original discussion of
stigma, Goffman included both psychological and social elements, but his ideas have
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primarily been used in the analysis of the psychological impact of stigma on
individuals. This has created an understanding of the psychology of the stigmatized,
focusing on the processes by which stigma is internalized and shapes individual
behavior. Yet, this has been to the exclusion of considerations of how social life and
relationships are changed by stigma” (Kleinman & Hall-Clifford, 2009, p. 418).
They argue that moral and cultural approaches to studying stigma are not necessarily unheard
of, and cite Goffman’s work as the first to address both individual and cultural level
experiences of stigma (Kleinman & Hall-Clifford, 2009; Yang et al., 2007). It is only in the
work following Goffman that the deficit becomes observable. Yang and colleagues (2007)
indicate that the gap is particularly noticeable in studying stigma in cross-cultural contexts,
such as in Chinese society, where the effects of stigma are felt most strongly in the moral life
of familial and social ties. They state,
“Something crucial is missed when stigma is seen as affecting the individual only; in
these examples from Chinese society, stigma is most grievously felt as its conditions
reverberate across social networks, such that both the entire network is threatened or
devalued and the individual sufferer is shunned, banned, or discriminated against
within that network as a defensive response. The end result for individuals with
mental illness and their families in China can be a kind of social death that threatens
the very existence, value, and perpetuity of the family group” (Yang et al., 2007, p.
1529).
Drawing from anthropological tenets and adopting concepts such as the social dimensions of
illness (Kleinman, 1988) and social suffering (Das et al., 2001; Kleinman et al., 1997), Yang
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et al., (2007) envision an approach to studying stigma that focuses on the moral mode of
what matters to individuals in their local worlds. They contend that what makes stigma so
devastating and important is its entanglement in the matters people engage with in everyday
life. Such is the case in every culture, including western cultures, where they critique that
“writings about stigma in the European and North American traditions of social thought have
not adequately attended to its moral dimensions” (Yang et al., 2007, p. 1530). They introduce
the theoretical and methodological contributions of moral experience to stigma research.
Moral experience describes the facets of everyday life, or the local world, that mean the most
to people in terms of what is at stake for people in their local world. These facets broadly
range from material concerns such as money and possessions, to social concerns like
relationships and status, or long terms factors such as health, life chances, and employment
(Yang et al., 2007, p. 1528). If something matters the most to a person, it qualifies as a moral
mode of life experiences, and therefore constitutes an element that is entangled with the
stigma experience.
Following the recommendations of Yang et al., (2007) and Kleinman and HallClifford (2009), the current project also returns to Goffman (1963) in search of possible
directions for stigma research that address the cultural and identity related components of the
stigmatization process. In particular, addressing what Goffman (1963) has to say about not
only culture, but cultural identity pertaining to stigmatization. Where Yang et al., (2007),
Kleinman and Hall-Clifford (2009) pursue a moral experience based approach to studying
stigma, this project will address a related cultural element of identity, the importance of
which being something Goffman (1963) speaks of frequently.
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A cultural identity conception of stigma is needed because there remain gaps in the
literature that thus far have not been addressed by existing frameworks. Knowledge of stigma
theory can directly inform the reduction efforts to combat it and the two need to be
synchronous. As Kleinman and Hall-Clifford (2009) state, “Understanding the unique social
and cultural processes that create stigma in the lived worlds of the stigmatized should be the
first focus of our efforts to combat stigma” (2009, p. 418). Furthermore, a cultural identity
approach to stigma may be uniquely situated to address many of the longstanding limitations
of the research, both in general theory and reduction related efforts. Within Stigma, Goffman
(1963) commonly points to the places in which a theory of cultural identity informs the
stigma process. These include the greater social structure that stigma is apart of, the
connections that exist between stigmatized and normal, and the identity values of a society.
Specifically, Goffman (1963) directs researchers to keep in mind three ideas while
studying stigma. First, stigma ultimately exists within the greater social structure, not within
the stigmatized topics themselves. Second, the space between stigmatized and normal is
largely illusory since a more accurate classification of them is as two points along the same
line. Third, stigma is directly related to what he refers to as the identity values of a society.
These ideas will be expanded upon further and used as the starting points for further
development towards a cultural identity strategy of stigma.
Goffman held that the central issue of stigma was not located within any individual
belonging to a particular stigma topic, but rather the place in the social structure that any
stigma topic inhabited. Therefore, while there is importance to dividing research according to
the particulars of stigmatized topics, he cautioned that doing so shouldn’t be independent
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from understanding the larger social structure from which they all inhabit. Warning against
focusing too closely on cataloguing the array of stigma topics he states,
“it is not very useful to tabulate the numbers of persons who suffer the human
predicament outlined in this book. As Lemert once suggested, the number would be as
high as one wanted to make it; and when those with a courtesy stigma are added, and
those who once experienced the situation or are destined, if for no other reason than
oncoming agedness, to do so, the issue becomes not whether a person has experience
with a stigma of his own, because he has, but rather how many varieties he has had
his own experience with” (Goffman, 1963, p. 129).
Isolating an inquiry into the stigma topic can inhibit exploration into the larger processes of
which stigmatization is inextricably apart of. This is because stigma is a multifaceted and
multidimensional construct, meaning that in order to understand how stigma affects
individuals, it must also be addressed how stigma is situated within the contextual social
forces of everyday life (Yang, 2007, pp. 981–984). These social forces are wide ranging and
include history, political forces, religious beliefs, as well as ethnic, moral, and cultural
influences (Goffman, 1963, p. 127; Yang, 2007, p. 981). When stigma is approached in this
manner, it opens the inquiry to consider what factors transcend the stigmatized individual to
connect them to the larger social structure, and to the others that participate in that same
structure.
A second point drawn by Goffman (1963) is that the connection between stigmatized
and normal should not be overlooked easily. He states, “the role of normal and the role of
stigmatized are parts of the same complex, cuts from the same standard cloth,” (1963, p. 12828

130) and by this he means that they constitute roles occupiable by everyone, not simply
categories that can be used to sort groups of people into. The proposition being made is that
stigmatization is not a unique predicament of the few; rather it is a process in which almost
everyone experiences at various points throughout their life (1963, p. 128). Therefore, if
everyone comes into contact with stigmatization throughout their lives, the resulting
conclusion is that individuals have knowledge pertaining to both stigmatized and normal
viewpoints simultaneously. They always carry both. Goffman (1963) goes on to say,
“Stigma involves not so much a set of concrete individuals who can be separated into
two piles, the stigmatized and the normal, as a pervasive two-role social process in
which every individual participates in both roles, at least in some connections and in
some phases of life. The normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather
perspectives” (Goffman, 1963, pp. 137–138).
This should not be interpreted to argue that Goffman believed the role of stigmatized and the
role of normal to be equivalent in experience, because he makes clear that they are not. The
takeaway is that they are connected, but what are they connected to? Yang and colleagues
(2007) argue that what connects these two perspectives has to do with the moral mode, or put
differently, what matters most to people in their everyday lives. They state, “Both the
stigmatizers and the stigmatized are engaged in a similar process of gripping and being
gripped by life, holding onto something, preserving what matters, and warding off danger”
(Yang et al., 2007, p. 1528). They go on to say,
“The focus on moral experience also allows a reconceptualization of how the socalled ‘others’ [normal] constitute the world of stigma. These are ones doing the
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stigmatizing, but they can also be members of a peer group, social network, or system
of care (e.g., parents, doctors). The anthropological approach sees all of these people
as inhabiting shared social space. Not just positioned differently within structures of
stigma, status, and prestige, they are bound together in getting things done, in the
practice of addressing illness and stigma. What matters most to all these ‘others’
interlaces with what matters to sufferers” (Yang et al., 2007, p. 1530).
What is shared between these two roles is what matters most to them; those factors that
connect them to things that are larger than they are. Family ties, morals, status, financial
security, and health are all things that connect and are shared in common by both the
stigmatizer and the stigmatized. For Yang and colleagues (2007), the moral mode of
everyday life is made the focus of that shared system. Goffman addresses another related
element that is shared in the stigma process: cultural identity values.
Goffman argues that stigma is not simply a spontaneous ill that arises out of its own
volition in a society. Rather, he is suggesting that stigma is a tool used by all people within a
society to engage with identity values. By situating stigmatized and normal both as roles in
which individuals reserve the knowledge and ability to enact both, he foregrounds this idea
that both stigmatized and normal, not stigmatized alone, are needed in order for the societal
project of identity to function (1963, p. 135). He elaborates,
“The general identity-values of a society may be fully entrenched nowhere, and yet
they can cast some kind of shadow on the encounters encountered everywhere in
daily living…It should be seen, then, that stigma management is a general feature of
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society, a process occurring wherever there are identity norms” (Goffman, 1963, pp.
128–130).
Such a proposition, that to engage with stigma is to also engage with identity, has not been
fully attended to within the stigma literature. Goffman describes identity values as special
kinds of norms because in their maintenance is at stake the “psychological integrity of the
individual” (Goffman, 1963, p. 128). Unfortunately, Goffmans (1963) main concern in
Stigma was on the interpersonal contingencies that arise between mixed encounters of
stigmatized and normal individuals, not on the identity values of a society. Therefore, these
literary gaps pertaining to societal identity values cannot be supplanted by Goffman himself.
The task at hand then moves to explore theories of identity to address these missing parts in
the literature.
Stuart Hall is one such figure to have elaborated of the idea of identity values in
societies and theorized not only on the issue of cultural identity, but also accommodated for
the complexity that is introduced into theories of identity when more than one identity is
considered. Using his own experiences of living in lower-middle class Jamaica, and later
England in “the shadow of the black diaspora – ‘in the belly of the beast,’” Hall’s work on
culture and identity always sought to return to experiences of diaspora and dis-placement
(Hall, 1989, pp. 35–36). In an appreciation letter about Hall’s contributions following his
passing in 2014, Solomos (2014) wrote,
“Hall’s engagement with these issues simultaneously drew on feminism,
psychoanalysis and the work of Frantz Fanon, in order to shift the emphasis away
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from focusing on unitary forms of identity to plural processes of identification”
(Solomos, 2014, p. 1672).
Hall’s focus specifically on multiculturalism and the accommodation beyond any one form of
identity is one reason his work is best equipped to explore Goffman’s propositions on
identity values. When applied through Hall’s theoretical tenets of cultural identity, the ideas
of stigma and cultural values suggested by Goffman become legible in new contexts. It is
these tenets that form the theoretical basis of the present project.
The subject of culture is often thought of as a sticky one—too broad to define, and
when it is adequately described, can become too generalized to be of any actual use. Instead
of regarding this aspect of culture as a barrier and skipping over it, Hall deconstructs what it
is that makes culture matter, especially in terms of identity, and in doing so, opens it up for
practical exploration and inquiry. Hall positions his conceptualizations against another
different way of thinking about cultural identity. The first way considers cultural identity as a
shared collective of qualities and values held by people who share a common history and
ancestry (Hall, 1989, p. 36). While Hall does not dispute this idea and its importance, he does
suggest that it alone is an incomplete view of the process, largely because it doesn’t address
the ways in which identity actually arises and survives within a culture. Therefore, he states,
“Cultural identity, in this second sense, is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of
‘being’. It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which
already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come
from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo
constant trans-formation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past,
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they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power. Far from
being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and
which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the
names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves
within, the narratives of the past” (Hall, 1989, p. 70).
Conceiving of identity in this way, as always active rather than static, as a production rather
than historical fact, enables the issue of cultural identity to be viewed as a material practice;
as something that can be operationalized, measured, and observed (Hall, 1989, p. 69). And in
doing so, the component parts of the cultural identity project become more accessible. Put
simply, a culture can be understood as a framework, or map, of ways to understand
ourselves, others around us, and our own place in the world (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 8). It
does this by developing networks of meaning. And it is meaning that bridges the connection
between the physical and material world with the invisible and symbolic world of language
and communication (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 10). This is because the physical world is
overflowing with perceptible information: differences, experiences, noises, sights…to
acknowledge them all would be impossible. To try would be stifling. Therefore, to navigate
in such a chaotic, unpredictable, diverse, and complicated world, networks of meaning, or
culture, are created and shared as a referent and guide for moving through time and space
together. Put another way,
“Meanings help us to interpret the world, to classify it in meaningful ways, to ‘make
sense’ of things and events, including those which we have never seen or experienced
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in real life but which occur in films and novels, dreams and fantasies, as well as
objects in the real world” (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 10).
Things in the world are given meaning by the way they are represented through language (Du
Gay et al., 1997, p. 13). The use of the term, network, is important because meaning making
through language is always a relational and interpretive process. New meanings are
established by mapping them onto meanings already known; the ways they differ from, how
they’re similar, how they’re new. Hall states,
“Meaning is not a transparent reflection of the world in language but arises through
the differences between the terms and categories, the systems of reference, which
classify out the world and allow it to be in this way appropriated into social thought,
common sense” (Hall, 1985, p. 108).
It is when specific meanings become widely shared and accepted that it is considered to be
culturally established; the ideology of a culture builds in this way. For Hall, the field of
difference is not neutral, it is always shaped through history and relations of power. Hall
pulls from Frantz Fanon (1963) to understand the severe implications of what such power is
capable of in the case of colonization: “This expropriation of cultural identity cripples and
deforms. If its silences are not resisted, they produce, in Fanon’s vivid phrase, ‘individuals
without an anchor, without horizon, colourless, stateless, rootless – a race of angels’” (Fanon,
1963, p. 176; Hall, 1989, p. 71). The meanings built with and upon in the project of cultural
identity are never neutral or starting from nothing. This is to say that the cultural identity
project is not neutral either. Like any other map, the cultural identity project is inscribed with
values about where each intersection relates to all the others, and so on. Hall writes,
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“Cultural identities are the points of identification, the unstable points of
identification or suture, which are made, within the discourses of history and culture.
Not an essence but a positioning. Hence, there is always a politics of position, which
has no absolute guarantee in an unproblematic, transcendental ‘law of history’”
(Hall, 1989, p. 72).
Goffman made a similar observation about personal identity when he wrote,
“By personal identity, I have in mind … positive marks or identity pegs, and the
unique combination of life history items that comes to be attached to the individual
with the help of these pegs for his identity” (Goffman, 1963, p. 57)
It is owing entirely to the cultural identity field that there are any such pegs, or spaces, to
attach onto. Moreover, cultural identity is a sophisticated process that accomplishes multiple
aims at the same time: it differentiates how someone is unlike and unique to others, while it
finds continuity in how someone is still comparable to others before them, while it maintains
previous expectations, or breaks from them and builds something new.
When stigma is reframed through Hall’s conception of cultural identity theory, it
becomes more than simply a descriptive collection of spoiled and shameful identities.
Instead, it becomes a piece in the cultural field of representations, always active and always
playing a part in what possibilities (and terrors) are readily available and accessible for a
individuals to call upon while making sense of their world. The primary task following these
assumptions and principles is to identify avenues through which such a framework can be
studied and tested. Two research questions and subsequent hypotheses are therefore proposed
as possible avenues. The first suggests that a shared experience of risk may be present in
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stigmatization through the form of ‘identity stakes.’ The second research question asks if
communicative, or symbolic, marks share common features in stigma communication when
compared to non-stigma communication.

2.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
2.4.i Research Question 1: Perceived Danger
The first project inquiry will address whether perceptions of danger may constitute a
shared element of stigmatization. Previously, measures for perceived danger have found
inconsistent responses depending on the topic of stigmatization being studied. This project
asks if this inconsistency in outcomes for perceived danger may be a theoretical and
measurement issue. Part of the reason discussions of perceived danger varies so much within
discussion of stigmatization is because there are so many various ways to conceptualize the
construct. The aim is therefore to ask whether so many constructs have a shared element, and
if that element is consistent across various types of stigmatization.
The element of perceived danger in stigma is a complex subject because there are so
many ways to conceive of danger as it pertains to processes of stigmatization. For social
psychologists, perceptions of danger are related to the attributions people make about others
which informs their emotions and subsequent behaviors. When Corrigan and colleagues
(2003) discuss dangerousness, they are referring to the stereotyped attributions specific to
mental illness: namely that those who are stigmatized with a mental illness are more likely to
be perceived as more physically dangerous, violent, and unpredictable (Corrigan et al., 2003;
Phelan et al., 2000). When Smith (2007) discusses dangerousness, a distinction is made
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between the communicative context cues called upon to draw attention to the danger a
stigmatized group poses to the community, what she terms as peril, and the specific quality
of the danger those cues are referring to. Peril describes the ways in which people
communicate to one another that a stigmatized group poses some kind of a threat to a
community (Smith, 2007). Several social psychological approaches consider stigma to
constitute an immediate situational threat that manifests itself in interpersonal
communication encounters where an individual can be presented with the danger of having
their identity spoiled by stigma attributions (Jones, 1984; Major & O’Brien, 2005).
Anthropologists argue that there is more to perceptions of danger than just
attributions about the person being stigmatized; they assert that danger is inherent to the
stigmatizing scenario itself, that those who risk being stigmatized perceive risk and danger as
well, just in a different sense. Goffman’s (1963) writings appear to support this interpretation
as he speaks of “direct instances of the situation, not the person, becoming threatened” (1963,
p. 136).
Proposed accordingly, they argue that anthropological and ethnographic approaches offer
something new to the field: that of moral experience and the resulting implications of the
consideration of a local world (Yang et al., 2007, p. 1528). Yang and colleagues (2007)
contend that the danger perceived in the stigma process is not just physical or relegated to a
single individual; rather, they suggest that the danger posed by stigma is fully entrenched in
the moral stakes of a culture. They state,
“Stigmatizing someone is not solely a response to sociological determinants or a
deeply interpretive endeavor played out in a cultural unconscious. It is also a highly
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pragmatic, even tactical response to perceived threats, real dangers, and fear of the
unknown. This is what makes stigma so dangerous, durable, and difficult to curb. For
the stigmatized, stigma compounds suffering. For the stigmatizer, stigma seems to be
an effective and natural response, emergent not only as an act of self-preservation or
psychological defense, but also in the existential and moral experience that one is
being threatened” (Yang et al., 2007, p. 1528).
The perceived danger being described by Yang and colleagues (2007) is a specific one: they
hypothesize that stigma represents a direct threat to “what is most at stake” for people, which
is the diminishment or destruction of their lived social and moral value (2007, p. 1530). Prior
to their work, moral stakes as an element of stigma had yet to be addressed in the preceding
literature. Yang and colleagues (2007) contend that such a perspective is valuable because
stigma shares similarities across contexts but what is most at stake ultimately shapes how
stigma is felt; and that what is most at stake is empirically discoverable (2007, pp. 1532–
1533).
Taken together, there are many possible sources for perceptions of danger. These
sources can range from attributions about potential for physical violence as in the case of
some mental illnesses (Corrigan et al., 2003), the danger a stigma poses to a community as in
the case of infectious diseases (Smith, 2007), a situational threat and the possibility of having
one’s identity spoiled by stigma (Goffman, 1963; Jones, 1984; Major & O’brien, 2005), or to
the threat stigma poses to social and moral value (Yang et al., 2007). So many manifestations
of a similar concept such as perceived dangerousness brings up the question of whether there
is an underlying element of perceived danger that is shared as a feature of stigmatization. The
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current project posits that if such a feature were a shared property of stigma, its most basic
form would likely be most observable in the form of uncertainty towards the arrival of a
stigma into a social situation. This is based on the insight from Hall (1985) on dominant
ideologies who maintains that “ideologies are systems of representation materialized in
practices,” (Hall, 1985, p. 104). By this, meaning that ideologies of identity constitute a
shared social project that everyone has some level of investment with and engages in
regularly through communication. It follows, therefore, that the arrival of a stigma into a
social situation represents an opportunity to ‘play,’ as Hall would put it, with the dominant
ideologies of a culture. Such an instance of play represents plausible uncertainty and may
manifest in the form of perceived danger.
Goffman demonstrated not only that stigmatized and normal have more in common
than it would first appear, he specified that what both carry is risk: the threat of failure to
maintain a social situation in accordance with societal identity values (Goffman, 1963, p.
133). Hall also points to this same threat and uses it as a keystone in his theorization of
cultural identity. Hall, however, does not refer to it as threat or risk. He refers to it as play.
Play as in, identity is constituted by boundaries of difference that are perpetually positioned
and repositioned to changing points of reference, places, and times. (Hall, 1989, p. 73). When
identity is described as in play, that means it is never permanent; it must always be reenacted
and reassured. Hall states that of the word play, “it suggests … the instability, the permanent
unsettlement, the lack of any final resolution” of any given representation (Hall, 1989, p. 73).
Also critical in the project of cultural identity is the strategic use of sameness and
difference. In order to create meaning about what something is, two processes are undergone:
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it is determined what the concept is similar to, but also what it is different from; what it is not
(Hall, 1989, pp. 73–74). Citing Saussure’s conception of language, communication through
language is only made possible through difference and distinguishing where concepts are in
relation to the others. Hall takes this idea of difference one step further to elaborate using
Derrida’s use of ‘differance’ to illustrate how language not only signifies what differs, it also
defers meaning and sets it up to be re-adapted and rearticulated (Hall, 1989, p. 74). Hall
states,
“This second sense of difference challenges the fixed binaries which stabilize
meaning and representation and show how meaning is never finished or completed in
this way, but keeps on moving to encompass other, additional or supplementary
meanings” (Hall, 1989, p. 74)
Meaning making is a historically precedented practice that never truly starts anew but instead
always builds on what has come before in order to make sense. He states, “Marx reminds us
that the ideas of the past weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (Hall, 1985, p.
111). Hall is very specific in that he holds reality is not simply reflected in language, it is
constituted and created through the representations of differences drawn between terms and
categories” (Hall, 1985, p. 97). As meanings become more complex, they can be thought of
as ideologies, or “the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world—the ‘ideas’
which people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what
they ought to do” (Hall, 1985, p. 99). His insistence on play and ‘differance’ is an important
one: because just as familiar meanings and ideologies require regular reassurances that the
status quo has remained the same, these points of repeatability also serve as opportunities to
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‘play’ with the representation, and transform it into something else, something perhaps
contrary to the status quo. Of this potential, Hall states,
“A particular ideological chain becomes a site of struggle, not only when people try
to displace, rupture or contest it by supplanting it with some wholly new alternative
set of terms, but also when they interrupt the ideological field and try to transform its
meaning by changing or re-articulating its associations, for example, from the
negative to the positive” (Hall, 1985, p. 112)
These critical points for struggle represent risk to ideologies-in-dominance. Even if unable to
change them completely, sites of discursive struggle still threaten to “set limits to the degree
to which a society-in-dominance can easily, smoothly and functionally reproduce itself”
(Hall, 1985, p. 113).
What is being described here is a concept of cultural identity stakes. The idea that,
regardless of a person’s particular alignment (or misalignment) with an identity ‘peg’, to use
Goffman’s term, there is an expectation, a shared compulsion, that the cultural identity values
which have been passed down previously should be validated and maintained in order to pass
to others. Proposed here is an idea that stigmatized identity ‘points’ (categories or topics)
represent critical cultural sites where identity values are utilized, at some point in time
whether previously, presently, or will be, in the movement of power. Identity stakes are
powerful because they are based on discursive formations of legitimate truth: what people in
a culture are ‘allowed,’ or ‘able’ to pull from in order to understand themselves. These
identity points are further valued and given positive or negatively valued cultural truths. The
entire practice of identity stakes is built upon communication and therefore is always subject
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to its own temporality. Reproduction of representations are the currency through which
legitimation is made ‘true’ and given value.
As Link and Phelan (2001) accurately describe, “Stigma is entirely dependent on
social, economic, and political power” (Link & Phelan, 2001, p. 375). Hall, pulling from
multiple Marxist theorists, gives an intelligible model for understanding the loaded concept
of ‘power’: he states,
“The problem of ideology, therefore, concerns the ways in which ideas of different
kinds grip the minds of masses, and thereby become a ‘material force.’ … It also has
to do with the processes by which new forms of consciousness, new conceptions of the
world, arise, which move the masses of the people into historical action against the
prevailing system. These questions are at stake in a range of social struggles” (Hall,
1986, p. 29).
The instances of representation regarding stigmatized identities carry stakes because the
discursive field is the arena through which their gained influence and meaning can continue
to exert such power, and it is also where that power can be contested, perhaps even shifted or
changed. It is not through the inherent properties of a stigmatized target where meaning
arises inherently; it is not through the presence of a stigmatized target that individuals
automatically know of the power relations in a society. Rather it is only through the
discursive tools that individuals use to communicate those very crucial meanings to members
of a society—and it is those same tools that are used to maintain and grow. This is not to
devalue the impact of structural forces of stigma, rather to elevate the necessity of symbolic
ideologies in maintaining, justifying, and enacting such material forces.
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The task of the current project is to question if these cultural constructs are
observable, and therefore measurable, through the communication of individuals. The
prediction is that the presence of a stigma represents an opportunity for individual play of
dominant ideologies, and therefore should invoke responses of uncertainty and perceived
danger. Operationally, an issue arises of how to measure such an abstract concept such as
perceived danger due to cultural maintenance. Previous measures for capturing perceived
danger have tended to focus exclusively on the cognitive attributions, such as measures of
perceived dangerousness which quantify the level of which a study participant perceives the
object in question to be a danger. Pulling more broadly from the risk perception literature,
The cognitive aspects of risk have been studied in depth and are based on two types of
evaluations: the first being dread risk, which includes a lack of feeling in control, perceptions
of high catastrophic potential, inequality between evaluated risks and benefits, as well as
general feelings of dread (Slovic, 1987). The second evaluation, unknown risk, involves the
extent to which an item is observable, knowable, new, and whether the effects of it are
delayed or immediate (Slovic, 1987). Many of these evaluations match with the processes
involved in measuring perceived responsibility and dangerousness in stigma. Specifically,
measures of perceived responsibility and dangerousness constitute measures of cognitive
risk.
Older models of risk perception placed affective responses after cognitive
evaluations, thus suggesting that positive or negative emotions followed a cognitive
assessment of the factors listed above. Several models for mental illness stigma have done
the same. Recent research has challenged this and instead suggests that people make initial
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appraisals that are not the result of analytical reasoning, but are instead “presumed to be
relatively effortless, intuitive, and automatic evaluations that are sensitive to events related to
survival (e.g., loss, threat, injustice) and opportunities (e.g., forming attachments”
(Karasawa, 1995; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Peters et al., 2004, p. 1352). This function
operates by way of an “affect heuristic” (Slovic et al., 2002) which asserts that people use
their affective responses to guide the formation of their cognitive risk evaluations.
More recently, researchers have begun to explore the possibility that risk perception
is not just a cognitive and logical process, but an emotional one as well (Peters et al., 2004).
More recently, studies have validated measures that address both cognitive and affective
elements of the risk perception experience (Smith et al., 2019). Smith and colleagues (2019)
distinguishes two elements that constitute danger appraisal, the first is the cognitive
dimension and is defined as perceiving a person to be a danger. The second dimension is the
affective component, defined as the emotional experience of feeling threatened (Smith et al.,
2019). Similarly, Yang and colleagues (2014) distinguish between tangible threat, defined as
the assessment that a person will be violent or elicit fear, and symbolic threat, which is
related to blameworthiness and anger (2014, p. 7).
The following hypotheses are therefore based on the recommendations covered thus
far. Previous measures for perceived dangerousness of stigmatization will be adapted and
supplanted with risk perception research to populate a taxonomy, located in table 1, of
perceived risk and benefit as divided by cognitive and affective measures. The taxonomy of
perceived risk measures is intended to first, result in translatable findings that can be
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understood in terms of previous stigma research, and second, to test for a shared variable of
perceived risk among stigmatized conditions when compared to non-stigmatized conditions.

2.4.ii Hypotheses
H1: Stigmatized conditions will receive higher ratings of negative affective measures, such
as anger, fear, disgust, and sadness, when compared to the non-stigmatized condition.
H2: The non-stigmatized condition will receive higher ratings of positive affective measures,
such as happy, friendly, excited, enthusiastic, and love, compared to both stigmatized
conditions.
H3: The non-stigmatized condition will receive higher ratings of positive cognitive measures,
such as perceived value and perceived quality, compared to the two stigmatized conditions.
H4: Both stigmatized conditions will receive significantly higher ratings of perceived risk
and dangerousness measures compared to the non-stigmatized condition.

2.4.iii Research Question 2: Verbal Marks
The second research question of this project reexamines the role of marking when
considered through the lens of a cultural identity theory. While marks are frequently
discussed in the stigma literature, they are usually contained in the form of nonverbal and
bodily communication and communicated by the stigmatized person themselves. This project
asks if that conceptualization could be expanded to contain verbal marks and be
communicated preceding the stigmatized status of an individual. To properly address this
question, a review of current conceptualizations of marks within stigma communication will
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be summarized. Following that, Hall’s (1985) theory of cultural identity will be applied to the
current definition of marks in order to reexamine those functions when viewed through a
different framework. After identifying possible cultural-based functions of marks, the
measurement of which will originate from an unexpected source in marketing
communication research.
First, in reviewing Smith’s (2007) Model of Stigma Communication (MSC), stigma
messages contain four basic features that include marks, group labeling, peril, and etiology
(2007, p. 463; Smith et al., 2019, p. 2). Within this model, marks and group labeling
represent two different functions within the stigma process. Marks are nonverbal cues that
are quickly recognized and evoke strong reactions in order to function as an alert that a
stigmatized categorization is present (Smith et al., 2019). Group labeling, while it can include
marks, is used to communicate that the stigmatized group is different from the normal and is
different because of the stigma. Smith (2019) states, “Labels arouse and reflect social
cognitions, such as considering stigmatized people to be a distinct group, highlighting
intergroup differences, encouraging categorization, and promoting stereotypes” (Smith,
2007; Smith et al., 2019, p. 2). In discussing the different forms that marks can take, Smith
(2007) describes two qualities of marks that include concealment and disgust (2007, p. 468).
Marks will vary depending on the degree to which it is possible to conceal them, such as a
physical bodily movement tic with Tourette’s syndrome which may be concealable, to a
Black individual’s race, which is largely not concealable. Marks will also frequently bear
disgust cues in order to evoke disgust responses, increase attention to the affixed person, and
encourage avoidance (2007, p. 469). Within the MSC, marks are typically described as
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nonverbal forms of communication, often expressed on the body. This is the standard within
stigma research: marks are considered nonverbal and/or bodily and there are no quantitative
instruments used to measure them. The second research question of the current project asks if
these understandings of marks within stigma could be expanded when considered in terms of
a cultural identity framework.
To review the assumptions of a perspective of stigma through cultural identity
theory, they include first, that stigma is not located within any one individual, that normal
and stigma represent two roles that are accessible via all individuals, and that stigma is a tool
used for engaging with a cultures identity values. Given these assumptions, the relevant
question is what function, if any, could marks serve within the process of cultural identity
value engagement? In order to address this question, insights from Stuart Hall (1985),
specifically pertaining to meaning making and signification, will be discussed.
For Hall (1985), identity is not simply reflected by culture, it is constructed through
signification practices that constitute representation and ideological social relations. The idea
that cultural identity consists of a network of symbolic ‘points’, or in Goffman’s term, ‘pegs’,
concerned with ways to understand the self, the world around the self, and the self’s place
within the world (Goffman, 1963, p. 56). Such a cultural identity network is built upon
firstly, representation (which is made possible through signification and language), and
secondly through the inscription and perpetual management of the values and meanings
embedded in given identities. Of direct interest to the second hypothesis is this management
of the cultural identity value network. Hall’s concept of ‘play’ comes to mind again because
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it encourages asking specifically who in a society is entrusted with the management, i.e.
reassurance, reenactment, repositioning, of such identity values (Hall, 1989).
One possibility is that everyone is tasked with the management of the identity values.
Although every individual may have equal means to take up the task, other considerations
such as their resources for doing so, the reception and effect of their practice, and their level
of investment in the field is not equal. In other words, although it would appear that all
individuals within a culture have the ability to reinforce, reposition, or radically shift identity
value norms, not all of them will do so with equal impact and effect. And one reason
individuals may continue to engage with such a network, despite a possibly limited range of
influence, is because, as Hall states, these frameworks of meaning are integral for individuals
to obtain a shared sense of who they are. Therefore, even if an individual is not directly
impacted by a given identity, there still exists connections that form a precedent in upholding
(or challenging) a status quo.
Considerations such as these are valuable because they expand the area of study to
include functions that occur even when no stigmatized individuals are physically present (or
their presence is concealed and/or minimized). The management of identity values,
especially those considered stigmatized identities, are always available and ready to be
invoked communicatively. This has yet to be fully explored within the stigma literature. The
relevant issue at present is the question of whether marks constitute a significant function
within cultural identity value management, and if so, how this function could be measured
quantitatively. Guidance towards addressing these questions will come from a potentially
unexpected source: from advertising and marketing research.
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The practice of advertising and marketing has several functions. Certainly, a key
element is in sharing information about a product and persuading audiences to purchase said
product. But an additional function crucial to successful marketing is the engagement with
relevant identity values of a culture. This is because, as Du Gay et al. (1997) explain,
“In order to sell, it must first appeal: and in order to appeal, it must engage with the
meanings which the product has accumulated and it must try to construct an
identification between us the consumers and those meanings” (Du Gay et al., 1997, p.
25).
Advertising can represent a significant structure in cultural identity because it regularly and
habitually engages with possible connections between individuals and the identity values of
their culture. Advertising communication is only effective insofar as the audience can
identify themselves with the individuals depicted in the message (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 25).
This process of identification operates on many different levels within the imagination—and
it is within the imagination—where the “idealized self-images” and “unspoken desires” are
made evident (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 26). Additionally, identification is not a unidirectional
process as the advertising message does not simply reflect the relevant values of the time, but
it also engages with them in productive, protective, or transformative ways. The messaging in
advertising is always simultaneously engaged in the past and present as well as the future
because the goal of advertising points towards the future: a future hopefully where viewers
purchase said products (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 39).
What remains, however, is the question of how the management of these values
manifest and whether they can be measured. There is reason to suspect that marking practices
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are involved in the process. Within cultural identity theory. the foremost principle is that
meaning is created through communication, specifically difference created with language (du
Gay et al., 1997). One way that meaning is created through difference is by the practice of
marking: by identifying the similarity and difference between two objects, it becomes
possible to distinguish between the two, and thus use that difference to form meaning. One
small caveat, however, is that communication is temporary in time. A difference spoken or
written about at one point in history is not necessarily everlasting, as individuals can pass
away, taking their stories, knowledge, and meanings with them. It is in this way that meaning
through communication is always inherently temporary. It must always continue to be
enacted if it is to persist. Thus, the identity values of a culture likewise only exist insofar as
they are repeatedly and consistently called upon through the meaning making process of
communication and language. Therefore, each individual experiences the stakes of identity
not only in relation to how they are played out upon their own bodies, but they also assume
responsibility for continuing to manage the identity values of a culture.
Given this information, a viable tool for measuring these marks would need to engage
directly with marking as a communicative practice that differentiates between two objects.
One possible tool that meets these criteria is the Evaluative Lexicon (EL). Matthew Rocklage
and Russel Fazio (2015) sought to create a novel approach to quantifying and measuring
attitudinal dimensions that captured multiple meanings and would be applicable across a
wide variety of settings. What they developed was the Evaluative Lexicon. Previous attitude
measurement tools were caught between one of two methodological approaches: the time
intensive open-ended approach, which required individuals to engage in introspection about
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their attitudes and beliefs, and a closed-approach, consisting of close-ended surveys such as
affective bias scales, and semantic differential scales (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015, p. 215). All
of which required research participants to reflect on and assess various dimensions of their
attitudes toward an object. The EL is a new tool that covers the same ground but does it
without needing the participant to reflect on their own attitudes. Instead, it relies on the
implied evaluations that evaluative adjectives connote in their usage. Meaning, Rocklage and
Fazio (2015) use evaluative adjectives themselves as the measure in which to draw rich
cognitive and emotional data from individuals that use them. Of the choice to focus on
adjectives, they state,
“We therefore focused on those words that are descriptive by their very nature:
adjectives. Adjectives are particularly important when expressing attitudes because
they are essentially communicators’ attempts to describe an object and their
favorability toward it (e.g., as beneficial, terrible, fantastic)” (Rocklage & Fazio,
2015, p. 216).
This showcases the wide range of applicability the measure has. In the case of the current
study, where attitudes and beliefs are of lesser importance to the symbols and signs being
communicated, a tool that measures ‘attempts to describe an objective and favorability
toward it’ is exactly what such a study requires.
The Evaluative Lexicon (EL) was created and validated through a series of studies
and publications. Its creation was facilitated in an initial study which collected a list of
adjectives used in prior evaluative research and met additional criteria set forth by the
investigators. The criteria included: the adjectives needed to be evaluative in nature, have
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positive or negative denotations, have consistent valence associated with them, were
applicable across several objects and contexts (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015, p. 216). The final
list contained 94 evaluative adjectives. From there, 132 participants were recruited to provide
normative ratings three key constructs for each adjective on the list. These constructs
included the valence, extremity, and emotionality implied for each evaluative adjective.
Survey participants were asked to rate each of the adjectives either on the implied valence, or
the implied emotionality (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015, p. 216). Implied valence was described to
participants as the extent to which a term implies a negative evaluation or a positive reaction.
Implied emotionality was described as the extent to which a term implies a reaction based on
emotional reaction. The third variable, extremity, was not presented to study participants, but
was instead calculated as an additional variable drawn from values of implied valence scores.
Extremity is related to valence in that it describes the extent of how positive or how negative
a reaction is (Rocklage et al., 2018, p. 1327).
The findings of the initial study demonstrated not only that individuals appear to be
able to conceive of the meanings of these adjectives across multiple dimensions, but also that
the final computed ratings for each adjective along those dimensions matched prior research
using the same terms (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015, p. 217). Subsequent studies used the values
of the EL compiled in the original study and tested the tools validity in measuring underlying
attitudes and the applicability to multiple methods of research as well as in experimental and
naturalistic settings.
The second task of this project uses the Evaluative Lexicon to ask whether the
qualities of evaluative adjectives, such as adjective count, adjective valence, adjective
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extremity, and adjective emotionality, can be operationalized as marks that significantly
measure stigmatized identities in an intercategorical manner. Doing so requires certain
assumptions to be made. First, it is assumed that marks related to the management of stigma
identities will be negative in adjective count, valence, extremity, and emotionality. Second, it
is assumed that non-stigma identities will be positive in adjective count, valence, extremity,
and emotionality. One benefit of the EL is that it allows the measurement of positivity and
negativity as two elements. It is therefore possible to be much more specific in measuring
these adjectives than in other attitude measurement survey instruments. Three tests will be
performed for every hypothesis: 1) do the stigmatized conditions differ from the nonstigmatized condition in the dependent variable? 2) are the stigmatized conditions parallel in
their associations with the dependent variable? And 3) are the associations in the assumed
directions with the dependent variable? Given these specifications, the following hypothesis
are as follows.

2.4.iv Hypotheses
H5: Both stigmatized conditions will receive significantly more negative adjective counts
than the non-stigmatized condition.
H6: The non-stigmatized condition will receive significantly more positive adjective counts
than both stigmatized conditions.
H7: Will the number of ambivalent and dichotomous adjectives differ significantly between
both stigma conditions?
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H8: Will there be a difference in negative adjective valence between the non-stigma
condition and the stigma conditions?
H9: Will there be a difference in positive adjective valence between the non-stigma condition
and the stigma conditions?
H10: Will there be a difference in positive adjective extremity between the non-stigma
condition and the stigma conditions?
H11: Will there be a difference in negative adjective extremity between the non-stigma
condition and the stigma conditions?
H12: Will there be a significant difference in positive adjective emotionality between the
non-stigma condition and the stigma conditions?
H13: Will there be a significant difference in negative adjective emotionality between the
non-stigma condition and the stigma conditions?
H14: Will the two outcome variables of adjective emotionality and affective scale measures
be significantly related to one another?
H15: Will any evaluative adjectives be significantly associated with the stigma and nonstigma conditions?

2.5 Case Study
On Wednesday, April 3, 2019 at 6:14PM EST the Gillette Venus Twitter handle
published a photo of body-positive influencer and author Anna O’Brien, also known as
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Glitter and Lazers, in her bathing suit on the beach. The tweet read, “Go out there and slay
Glitter + Lazers.” The tweet was not unlike the others that had come before it

the day

with a snappy slogan, some emojis, and an uplifting photo, except for one noticeable
difference: Anna O’Brien is a plus-size model. While she was not the first plus-size model to
be featured in one of their tweets, the majority of the women shown prior to April 3 were thin
women. The tweet went viral. At the time, tweets from the account on average received less
than 50 interactions per tweet, but the Glitter and Lazers image throttled to thousands of
likes, retweets, and comments. Major news outlets soon picked up on and reported on the
hype drawn from the tweet.
Debates about the message of the tweet sprung up. Some argued that the brand was
“promoting” and “glorifying” obesity, and many requested that Gillette delete the post (Di
Filippo, 2019). One comment read, “Hey Gillette this is not healthy at all, people of this size
run the risk of early death due to heart failure and many more health issues” (Gillette’s New
Venus Advert Sparks Fat Phobia Debate with Choice of Model, 2019). Many comments
accused Gillette of “’irresponsibly’ promoting an unhealthy lifestyle for profit” (Cerullo,
2019). Likewise, appeals to danger were included as one comment read, “Please stop.
Promoting this is dangerous. Being unhealthy is not a good thing,” (Cerullo, 2019). Those
familiar with stigma communication cues may notice the appeals to responsibility and peril
appear here as they do with other stigmatized topics such as mental illness and infectious
diseases.
In addition to appeals for responsibility, danger, and health, many also posted
animated gif reaction images, memes, and jokes at the model’s expense. One animated gif
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shows an image of Homer Simpson pouring bleach into his eyes while he screams. Another
image shows an illustration of a whale with a razor head for a tail-the caption reads, “shave
the whales.” Another comment shows a possibly photoshopped image of someone in a bikini
who is underweight and has bone structure showing through her skin. The comment reads,
“Get out there and slay the day!” meant to imply that Gillette might as well be encouraging
people develop eating disorders such as Anorexia as well. One gif response shows actor and
celebrity Johnny Depp dressed up as Jack Sparrow and making a disgusted/gagging
expression. Another user posted a poll that read, “This was a…” with options “Good idea”
and “Bad idea.” Out of 20,587 votes, 11.1% responded “Good idea,” while “88.9%”
responded, “Bad idea.” These examples can be understood as what Burmeister and Carels
(2014) refer to as disparagement humor. They suggest that the level of engagement of
enjoyment of jokes negatively targeting someone of a lower social class coincides with an
increased level of agreement with stigmatized attitudes towards that group (Burmeister &
Carels, 2014).
On the other side of the debate, many disagreed with the backlash and responded in
support of Gillette and O’Brien. One user responded, “Are you this person’s doctor? Do you
know if they are unhealthy? How? Where is her medical history in the tweet?” (GMA Team,
2019). Another user commented, “Weight is not an indicator of health, and health is not an
indicator of worth” (GMA Team, 2019). Another user wrote, “I know this is just a trickle of
positivity in a sea of madness, but I just wanted to say thank you for posting this. I know and
love a lot of people that are big and it breaks my heart to see the abuse they endure daily.
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Thank you for helping to normalize love for all bodies” (Jorgenson, 2019). One user
commented, “You are slaying sister!

” (Jorgenson, 2019).

The attention drawn was so great that it led to the brand adding their own comment
under the tweet the next day that read,
“Venus is committed to representing beautiful women of all shapes, sizes, and skin
types because ALL types of beautiful skin deserve to be shown. We love Anna because
she lives out loud and loves her skin no matter how the ‘rules’ say she should display
it” (Gillette Venus, 2019).
The ABC News Good Morning America Team reached out to O’Brien regarding the viral
tweet. She responded, “What people who aren’t plus-sized don’t know is this is our everyday
existence. I wanna show women that they can do whatever they want. If you look at my
image, it’s joyful. It’s happy. It’s inspired. I’m living a great life, but for a lot of people, all
they can see is fat” (GMA Team, 2019).
The debate even extended into the realm of journalism, as some outlets favored
Gillette’s approach to fat positivity while others, such as CBS News journalist Megan
Cerullo, framed their coverage of the tweet favoring critique. Cerullo wrote regarding the
subject,
“More than one-third of American adults are considered obese. That can cause
coronary artery disease, hypertension, type 2 diabetes, high cholesterol, obstructive
sleep apnea, osteoarthritis of the knees and other joints, as well as fertility problems,
according to NYU Langone Health. … Experts believe Gillette intended to make a

57

splash by wading into polarizing territory among a new generation of consumers who
view brands as extensions of themselves” (Cerullo, 2019).
It is clear the tweet had entered highly contentious cultural territory regarding fat acceptance
that wasn’t resolved prior to the tweet and continued to be debated long after it’s virality
faded.
The current study uses the case of the viral 2019 Gillette Venus tweet as a naturalistic
example of both cultural identity threat and as a discursive play of dominant ideological
identity values pertaining to fatness. An experimental survey is then created, including
vignettes replicating the scenario presented by the viral tweet. Two stigmatized conditions
are chosen for the study stimuli: fatness and Schizophrenia. The stigma of fat body weight is
chosen because it is the stigma in question of the viral tweet. It is also chosen because the
measurement of fat stigma is related to attributions of responsibility and causality regarding
the responsibility to manage ones weight and personal health (A. A. Brewis et al., 2011;
Stangl et al., 2019). These factors are posited to explain a majority of fat stigma rather than
perceived dangerousness. Because modified perceptions of dangerous are of key interest to
the study, the second stigma condition chosen is mental illness, specifically the condition of
Schizophrenia. The stigma of Schizophrenia is related to attributions of physical
dangerousness and this attribution is frequently cited as the reason for increased levels of
social distancing (Link et al., 1987; Penn et al., 1999; Steadman, 1981). Therefore, two
conditions that represent low and high in traditional attributions of perceived dangerousness
will be tested to measure modified measures of perceived risk pertaining to cultural threat.
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The two conditions are also chosen because the dominant ideologies regarding each
include discursive challenges and struggles to the common-sense status quos. In the case of
mental illness and Schizophrenia, the link between mental illness and proclivity of physical
dangerousness has been subject to debate about whether individuals suffering from mental
illness are more dangerous than those who are not (Penn et al., 1999). In the case of fatness,
there are likewise struggles to common-sense status quos regarding the link between fat body
weight and negative health outcomes (Lyons, 2009). Both stigmatized conditions therefore
represent cultural points of struggle, or play, where stigma verbal marks are expected to be
utilized by actors involved. In this way, both stigmatized conditions of Schizophrenia and
fatness satisfy the conditions necessary to test both research questions of interest in the
present study. First, in testing the existence of a shared cultural threat among two stigmatized
conditions typically rated low and high with traditional measures of perceived
dangerousness. Second, in testing for use of verbal marks in the form of evaluative adjectives
used in the discursive management of cultural identity values as applied to fatness and mental
illness.

2.6 Summary
The present state of stigma research is vast and complex, hailing contributions from
several different fields such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and communication.
Although the initial catalyst for such research, Goffman’s 1963 publication on stigma
remains the first and among the only attempts to synthesize many forms of marginalization
under the conceptual umbrella of stigma. In the time since, much research has proliferated
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according to the type of stigmatization, but less attention has been paid to intercategorical
translation efforts and broader theoretical justification of the concept. The current project
proposes a strategy to be used toward synthesizing existing knowledge about various forms
of stigma into a common framework. Guided by Goffman’s (1963) recommendations and
supplanted using Stuart Hall’s (1985, 1986, 1989) theory of cultural identity, the current
project proposes a framework of cultural identity stakes to be tested for possible utility
towards these aims of inter-categorical assessment and evaluation. The project will include
two research questions, the first involving expanded perceptions of danger and the second
testing the role of verbal marks in the form of evaluative adjective elements. The intention is
to identify possible methodological tools, based in theoretically driven constructs, that can
demonstrate shared properties across two differing types of stigmatized conditions.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS

3.1 Study Design
The present study used this viral Gillette Tweet case as a starting point for an
experimental survey analysis of stigma. The image of Anna O’Brien was included for the fat
stigma condition, and a similarly staged image of a thin woman was sourced for the thin
condition. From here, the study design was adjusted to add conditions for the presence of
mental illness: Schizophrenia stigma, and no mental illnesses present through the use of a
written “bio” accompanying the images. The format presentation was adjusted from a
Twitter-based presentation into a hypothetical vignette loosely adapted from O’Keefe’s
(1988) message design approach for eliciting communicative elements from respondents in
an evaluative manner. The hypothetical vignette framed the survey as an exercise for the
participant to evaluate potential candidates for employment or for becoming a patient at a
private practice. This method was chosen to encourage participants to evaluate the person in
the conditions.
3.2 Study Sample
A convenience sample of 281 college students were recruited from social science
courses to participate in an online survey about adjective use and identities. 273 (n = 273)
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students completed the survey. Of the completed respondents, the majority age was low
twenties, with over 90% of respondents reporting their age between 18-23. Respondents were
also majority female (n = 171), with over 60% reporting female compared to men (n = 99).
Concerning the reported race of participants, 40% reported being white (n = 108), 30%
reported Asian (n = 81), 18% reported Black (n = 49), and 11% reported “Other” (n = 31). A
complete table of participant demographics is found in Table 2.
3.3 Procedure
Participants were recruited to complete an online survey for course credit in various
social science classes including Introduction to Sociology, Introduction to Communication,
The Self in Society, and Customer Relationship Management. Procedures were approved by
the institutional review board (IRB). Recruitment to participate in the study occurred through
in-person visits to classrooms where the investigator presented information about the study,
how to participate, eligibility guidelines, the voluntary nature of the survey, and anonymity
of submissions. The survey was divided into two parts: first, they would be exposed to an
experimental condition and prompted to evaluate the stimulus. Second, they were then asked
to fill out those same evaluation measures as they applied to themselves. After providing
consent to participate in the study and verifying their age of 18 years or older, participants
were presented with one of two possible hypothetical vignettes describing a scenario where
an applicant would need to be evaluated by the participant filling out the survey.
Participants were then shown identical profiles of the “applicant,” with the only
differences being the two experimental manipulations for body weight stigma and mental
illness stigma. Further details about the experimental manipulation will be provided in the
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following subsection for manipulation. In addition to the photo, all respondents were shown
basic information text about the applicant. Following the presentation of the applicant profile,
participants were prompted to evaluate the applicant Rachel Johnson using several measures
including open-ended items, selection of adjectives from word banks, and Likert-style scale
items. After completing the evaluation of the applicant, the participants were asked to fill out
the Likert-style scale items again, with themselves as the person being evaluated instead of
the stimulus. Lastly, participants were asked to provide demographic information about
themselves before reaching a concluding page with repeated information about the voluntary
nature and anonymity of their responses, and an option to request course credit before
submitting their responses.
3.4 Manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (scenario:
doctor’s office or advertising agency) x 2 (body weight stigma: fat or thin) x 2 (mental illness
stigma: schizophrenia or no mental illness) factorial design. First, participants were randomly
sorted into one of two possible environmental conditions consisting of a doctor’s office or
advertising agency’s vignette. Both vignettes were designed to be identical except for the
environmental stimulus of either an advertising scenario, or a medical office scenario. The
advertising scenario reads as follows:
“For this survey, imagine that you are the Director of Advertising for a well-known
brand. It is part of your job to review applications and oversee the decision process
for deciding which professional models will be featured in the company's print
advertisements. Today your assistant has delivered a folder containing an application
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that was recently submitted. On the following pages, please carefully look over this
application then answer the following questions.”
The medical office scenario reads:
“For this survey, imagine that you are the Head Physician for a well-known medical
practice. It is part of your job to review applications and oversee the decision process
for accepting new patients. Today your assistant has delivered a folder containing a
patient application that was recently submitted. On the following pages, please
carefully look over this application then answer the following questions.”
From there, participants were randomly assigned to one of four possible experimental
conditions designed to operationalize stigma due to body weight (a fat stimulus and a thin
stimulus), and mental illness (a stimulus with Schizophrenia, and a stimulus with no mental
illness), resulting in four possible experimental conditions. The four possible conditions
include Fat + Schizophrenia, Fat + No mental illness, Thin + Schizophrenia, and Thin + No
mental illness. The applicant profile presented text information about the stimulus, Rachel
Johnson, in addition to a photograph. The profile text reads,
“Applicant Name: Rachel Johnson
Age: 31
Height: 5’ 7”
Preexisting Conditions: [Schizophrenia] OR [N/A]
Weight: [250 lbs.] OR [115 lbs.]”
These specifications were the only differences between experimental conditions, and all other
elements of the survey were identical for all participants.
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3.5 Measures
The survey included several measures to represent the theoretical constructs of
interest, including perceived affective benefit, perceived affective risk and dangerousness,
perceived cognitive benefit, and perceived cognitive risk and dangerousness. In addition to
the formal measures, the survey also included tools from the Evaluative Lexicon (Rocklage
& Fazio, 2015).
Formal survey measures used in the survey represent constructs identified by the
attribution model of mental illness stigma (Corrigan et al., 2003), and the model of stigma
communication (Smith, 2007), including perceived risk and perceived dangerousness. In
addition to traditional stigma survey items, a measure for affective feelings of risk was Peters
and Slovic’s (2007) HUE: Holistic, Unipolar, Discrete Emotion scale, as well as Smith’s
(2012) measure for perceived dread. Lastly, in an effort to incorporate Slovic et al.’s (2004)
benefit perceptions to the measures of perceived risk, the positive items in Peters and
Slovic’s (2007) HUE measure was included in addition to Dodds and colleagues (1991)
scales for perceived quality.
Two items for perceived dangerousness (Smith et al., 2019) and one item for
perceived risk (E. M. Peters et al., 2004) are used to assess the degree to which the survey
respondent judges the decision to hire the hypothetical individual portrayed in the survey
stimulus as dangerous, a risk, and unpredictable (α = .799). These three items were averaged
into one score to represent perceived risk/dangerousness with lower scores indicating lower
perceived risk and higher scores indicating higher perceived risk (M = 2.73, SD = 1.52).
Response options are ordered on a seven-point Likert-style scale from Not at All (1) to Very
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Much (7). Examples of these items include, “The decision to hire Rachel for the modeling
job would be [Dangerous], [A Risk], and [Unpredictable].”
The holistic, unipolar, discrete emotion (HUE) evaluative measures consists of 10
unipolar discrete emotion terms and asks participants to respond the degree to which the term
applies to the topic of interest (Peters & Slovic, 2007). Divided in half, there are five positive
HUE items: happy, friendly, enthusiastic, loving, and excited, (M = 18.25, SD = 8.691, α =
.916) and five negative HUE items: upset, angry, annoyed, disgusted, and afraid (M = 6.92,
SD = 3.579, α = .800). A measure for feeling threatened (Smith et al., 2019) includes two
items to assess the degree to which the stimulus makes the survey participants feel
threatened. These two items include, “Rachel makes me feel [Threatened]” (M = 1.31, SD =
.918) and “Rachel makes me feel [Uneasy]” (M = 1.78, SD = 1.342).
In an effort to include cognitive measures for both perceived risk and perceived
benefit, scales for perceived quality were adapted from Dodds and colleagues (1991) to
accommodate the need for a cognitive measure of perceived benefit. Because the original
scales were used to evaluate products, the items were adapted to apply to the evaluation of a
person. Perceived quality is designed to measure the conceptualization of the cognitive
tradeoff between perceived quality and sacrifice (Dodds et al., 1991). The measure consists
of five items including examples such as, “Rachel seems [Reliable],” “Rachel seems
[Good],” and “Rachel seems [Dependable]” (M = 19.25, SD = 7.041, α = .919). An average
of the five items was used for analysis.
The Evaluative Lexicon (EL), developed by Rocklage and Fazio (2015), is a program
that allows researchers to quantify evaluative adjectives according to three elements designed
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to distinguish between implied affect and cognition that are elicited when people use
language. These three elements include adjective valence, extremity, and emotionality. The
Lexicon of evaluative adjectives was created by compiling lists of evaluative adjectives, then
asking study participants to judge each adjective according to its implied valence, extremity,
and emotionality. The final Evaluative Lexicon, comprised of 94 adjectives, has been
experimentally validated to accurately demonstrate implicit attitudes that are elicited through
use of adjectives. Through these measures, adjective implied valence, extremity, and
emotionality was calculated and stored in the Evaluative Lexicon program.
For the current project, adjectives were elicited from participants using word banks
containing the 94 terms of the EL. To lighten the cognitive load for participants, the
adjectives were divided into three separate categories: neutral, negative, and positive
adjectives, where one category displayed per page. Adjectives were divided according to the
valence score; 42 adjectives with a mean valence score of 6.0 or larger were placed in the
‘positive’ category, 40 adjectives with a valence score of less than 2.54 were placed in the
‘negative’ category, and ten adjectives with scores ranging from 2.74 to 5.94 were place in
the ‘neutral’ category. With the stimulus image appearing at the top of every new page, the
items for adjective elicitation read,
“The following choices show a selection of [NEUTRAL/NEGATIVE/POSITIVE]
adjectives. Please select any of the adjectives that you feel accurately describe
Rachel. If more than one adjective applies, multiple selections can be made. If none
of the adjectives apply, leave them blank and click ‘Next.’”
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Designing the data collection with word bank selection as opposed to open-ended text entry
allowed the researcher to control of the direction that the adjectives would be used. When
open-ended text entry is used, it can be necessary to remove data that includes adjectives
from the EL but is preceded by negation (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015, p. 219).
3.6 Data Processing
Before analysis, the responses of 281 participants were examined for missing values,
accuracy of data entry, and fit between distributions and assumptions. Of the 281
submissions, 8 were removed for either not completing the survey, or for having missing
values for more than 90% of the survey. Assumptions of normality and possible extreme
scores were determined separately for each demographic group and variable. Variables that
did not meet assumptions of normality were analyzed twice using parametric and
nonparametric statistics.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The results of this study are divided along two main research aims. The first research
question asks if there is a shared sense of danger, risk, or peril that is aroused when a stigma
topic is present. To answer this question, several hypotheses were tested. Hypotheses 1-4
address elements of testing the relationship between two stigma conditions and adapted
measures of perceived danger. The second research question asks if there are verbal marks
that are elicited when asked to evaluate two stigma conditions. Hypotheses 5-15 will test the
relationship between two stigma conditions and various elements of evaluative adjectives of
the Evaluative Lexicon (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015).

H1: Stigmatized conditions will receive higher ratings of negative affective measures, such
as anger, fear, disgust, and sadness, when compared to the non-stigmatized condition
The first hypothesis predicted that stigmatized conditions (fat and Schizophrenia)
would receive higher ratings of negative affective measures, such as anger, fear, disgust, and
sadness, when compared to their non-stigmatized counterparts (thin and no mental illness).
To test this hypothesis, a correlation table was produced. This analysis showed that the
condition stigmatized with mental illness was significantly related to ratings of negative
affect (r = .121, p = .048), however, the fat stigma condition was not. The direction of the
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association was tested using an independent samples one-way ANOVA. Results showed that
participants in the Schizophrenia condition rated higher levels of negative affect (M = 1.56,
SD = .885) compared to those in the condition with no mental illness (M = 1.37, SD = .714);
F(1, 267) = 3.94, p = .048. From these findings, H1 was not fully supported because the
prediction specified that both stigmatized conditions would receive higher ratings of negative
affect. The results demonstrated that only one stigmatized condition (mental illness) received
higher ratings over the non-stigmatized condition (no mental illness).

H2: The non-stigmatized condition will receive higher ratings of positive affective measures,
such as happy, friendly, excited, enthusiastic, and love, compared to both stigmatized
conditions
The second hypothesis predicted that non-stigmatized conditions (thin and no mental
illness) would receive higher ratings of positive affect items, such as happy, friendly, excited,
enthusiastic, and love, compared to their stigmatized counterpart conditions (fat and
schizophrenia). This hypothesis was tested by running a correlation table. Results showed
that only Fat and Thin conditions demonstrated a significant association (r = .276, p < .001).
Furthermore, an independent samples one-way ANOVA examining the relationship between
Fat/Thin conditions and positive affect showed that the stigmatized fat condition received
higher levels of positive affect (M = 4.03, SD = 1.71) compared to the non-stigmatized thin
condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.55); F(1, 270) = 22.188, p < .001. From these findings, H2 was
rejected. Positive affect did not have similar associations to two conditions of
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stigmatizations, and in the case that there was a significant association it was in the opposite
direction than predicted.

H3: The non-stigmatized condition will receive higher ratings of positive cognitive measures,
such as perceived value and perceived quality, compared to the two stigmatized conditions
Hypothesis 3 predicted that non-stigmatized conditions would receive higher ratings
of positive cognitively based measures, such as perceived value and perceived quality,
compared to the stigmatized counterpart conditions. This was tested first by producing a
correlation table, the full correlation matrix can be found in Table 2. Results showed that
only the fat/thin conditions were significantly associated with perceived quality (r = .127, p =
.043). None of the conditions were significantly associated with perceived value. Hypothesis
3 also predicted that the significant association would be in a specific direction, with nonstigmatized conditions predicted to received higher levels of positive cognitive measures. For
the fat/thin conditions, this was tested using an independent-samples one-way ANOVA,
shown in Table 3.
Results showed, with marginal significance, that participants in the stigmatized fat condition
reported higher levels of perceived quality (M = 4.01, SD = 1.49) compared to that reported
by those in the non-stigmatized thin condition (M = 3.68, SD = 1.35); F(1, 268) = 3.669, p =
.056. From these findings, H3 was rejected. The two stigmatized conditions were not
simultaneously associated with positive cognitive measures, and when one of the stigmatized
conditions was significantly associated, it was in the opposite direction than predicted.
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While H3 was rejected, additional analyses produced interesting findings worth
noting. First, a post hoc multiple comparisons test showed that among the four experimental
conditions, Fat/NA, Fat/Schizophrenia, Thin/NA, and Thin/Schizophrenia, the Fat/NA
condition (subject being rated was stigmatized with Fat condition but not mental illness) was
significantly different from the three other condition combinations. This was interesting,
because while the weight stigma condition was significantly related to perceived quality, this
effect was not observed in both fat condition groups (Fat/NA and Fat/Schizophrenia). To
explore this difference further, a test for possible interaction effects between weight stigma
and mental illness stigma on perceived quality was conducted. Results showed that there was
an interaction effect present between the two stigma conditions on perceived quality, F(1,
266) = 4.831, p = .029. The results indicated a ‘sweet spot’ interaction effect, which suggests
that the effect was only significant in a specific combination of conditions. The ‘sweet spot’
interaction effect was only observed in the Fat/Schizophrenia group and suggests that the
mental illness stigma added to the Fat/Schizophrenia group introduced an effect on perceived
quality that was not present in the Fat/NA group.
In addition to the interaction effect between weight and mental illness conditions on
perceived quality, a significant gender effect was also observed; F(1, 263) = 4.280, p = .04.
Of the survey respondents that were men, reports of perceived quality were observed in the
hypothesized direction with ratings of perceived quality decreasing from thin condition (M =
3.568, SD = 1.266, N =58) to fat conditions (M = 3.356, SD = 1.209, N = 41). Conversely,
respondents that were women demonstrated the opposite direction of reported perceived
quality. Among women respondents, those in the thin condition reported overall lower levels
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of perceived quality (M = 3.776, SD = 1.412, N = 76) compared to those in the fat condition
(M = 4.305, SD = 1.536, N = 92). In response to this gender effect, a second ANOVA was
conducted while controlling for gender. Results showed that when gender was controlled for,
the effect from fat/thin stigma conditions moved to non-significant levels, the mental illness
stigma conditions became significant; F(1, 266) = 4.549, p = .034; and the interaction effect
between mental illness and body weight stigma conditions remained significant; F (1, 266) =
4.553, p = .034. The implications drawn from these results will be discussed further in the
next section.

H4: Both stigmatized conditions will receive significantly higher ratings of perceived risk
and dangerousness measures compared to the non-stigmatized condition
Hypothesis 4 predicted that both stigmatized conditions of body weight and mental
illness would be significantly associated with perceived risk and dangerousness measures
compared to their non-stigmatized counterparts of thin and no mental illness, with the
stigmatized conditions reporting higher levels of perceived risk and dangerousness. To test
this hypothesis, a correlation table was first produced, shown in Table 4. Findings showed
that only the stigmatized Schizophrenia/No mental illness conditions were significantly
associated with perceived risk and dangerousness (r = .207, p = .001). To test the direction of
the association, an independent-samples one-way ANOVA was conducted between the
Schizophrenia/No mental illness conditions and perceived risk and dangerousness. The
results of the ANOVA can be found in Table 5. Results showed that participants in the
stigmatized Schizophrenia condition reported higher levels of perceived risk and
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dangerousness (M = 3.04, SD = 1.60) compared to those in the no mental illness condition (M
= 2.41, SD = 1.37) F(1, 266) = 11.948, p = .001. From these results, H4 was not supported.
While the mental illness stigma conditions were significantly associated with perceived risk
and dangerousness in the predicted direction, H4 predicted that both stigmatized conditions
for weight and mental illness would produce similar significant associations and this was not
the case.

H5: Both stigmatized conditions will receive significantly more negative adjective counts
than the non-stigmatized condition
H6: The non-stigmatized condition will receive significantly more positive adjective counts
than both stigmatized conditions
Hypothesis 5 and 6 predicted that negative adjective counts would be significantly
associated with stigmatized conditions, and that positive adjective counts would be
significantly associated with non-stigmatized conditions, respectively. H5 was rejected due to
none of the conditions having significant associations with negative adjective counts.
Concerning H6 and positive adjective counts, the fat/thin conditions were significantly
associated with positive adjective count (r = .177, p = .003), however an independent
samples one-way ANOVA revealed that the direction of the association was opposite to what
was predicted. Participants in the fat condition reported a significantly larger amount of
positive adjectives (M = 5.76, SD = 5.80, N =136) than those in the thin condition (M = 3.91,
SD = 4.413, N = 137); F(1, 271) = 8.756, p = .003. Considering these results, H6 was rejected
as well.
74

H7: Will the number of ambivalent and dichotomous adjectives differ significantly between
both stigma conditions?
H7 asked if the number of ambivalent and dichotomous adjectives would differ
significantly between stigma conditions of body weight and mental illness. A correlation
table was run to address this question. No significant association was observed between
stigma conditions and ambivalent adjective counts. Concerning the number of dichotomous
adjectives used, results showed that only mental illness stigma conditions of
Schizophrenia/NA were significantly associated with the number of dichotomous adjectives
used to evaluate the stimulus (r = -.216, p = .030). An independent samples one-way
ANOVA demonstrated that participants in the Schizophrenia condition rated the stimulus
with significantly fewer dichotomous adjectives (M = .77, SD = .425, N = 48) than
participants in the no mental illness condition (M = .92, SD = .267, N = 53); F(1,99) = 4.837,
p = .030.

H8: Will there be a difference in negative adjective valence between the non-stigma
condition and the stigma conditions?
H8 asked if there would be a difference in negative adjective valence between the
stigma conditions, and if there was a difference, whether it would be in line with adjective
count results. This was first tested by creating a correlation table, which showed that only
body weight stigma conditions were significantly associated with negative adjective valence
(r = -.232, p = .002). To examine the direction of the association, an independent-samples
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one-way ANOVA was run between body weight stigma and negative adjective valence.
Results demonstrated that when participants used negative adjectives, those in the
fat/stigmatized condition used more negatively valenced adjectives (M = 2.13, SD = .828)
than participants in the thin/non-stigmatized condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.01); F(1, 199) =
10.154, p = .002. These results show that while there was a difference in negative adjective
valence between fat and thin conditions, the association did not carry over into mental illness
stigma conditions.

H9: Will there be a difference in positive adjective valence between the non-stigma condition
and the stigma conditions?
H9 asked if there would be a difference in positive adjective valence between two
stigmatized conditions and their non-stigmatized counterparts (body weight and mental
illness). This question was addressed first through a correlation table. Results showed that
both stigma categories were significantly associated with positive adjective valence. Body
weight (r = -.168, p = .014) and mental illness (r = -.164, p = .016) stigma were both
negatively associated with positive adjective valence. In order to examine this association
further, an independent-samples one-way ANOVA was conducted for both body weight and
mental illness stigma with positive adjective valence. Concerning body weight stigma,
participants exposed to the thin stimulus reported more positively valenced adjectives (M =
7.889, SD = .254, N = 120) than those exposed to the fat stimulus (M = 7.830, SD = .171, N =
131); F(1, 249) = 4.760, p = .030. Likewise, participants exposed to the no mental illness
stimulus reported more positively valenced adjectives (M = 7.892, SD = .224, N = 123) than
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those exposed to the Schizophrenia stimulus (M = 7.826, SD = .205, N = 128); F(1, 249) =
5.841, p = .016.

H10: Will there be a difference in positive adjective extremity between the non-stigma
condition and the stigma conditions?
H10 asked if there would be a difference in positive adjective extremity between two
stigmatized conditions and their non-stigmatized counterparts (body weight and mental
illness). This question was tested using a correlation table, which showed that both stigma
conditions of body weight (r = -.168, p = .014) and mental illness (r = -.164, p = .016) were
significantly associated with adjective extremity in positive adjectives. To examine the
directions of these associations, independent-samples one-way ANOVA’s were conducted
for both stigma conditions with positive adjective extremity. Concerning body weight stigma,
when participants used positive adjectives, they tended to be more extreme for those shown
the thin stimulus (M = 3.389, SD = 254, N = 120) than those shown the fat stimulus (M =
3.330, SD = .171, N = 131); F(1, 249) = 4.756, p = .030. Likewise in mental illness stigma,
when participants used positive adjectives, they tended to be more extreme for those shown
the no mental illness stimulus (M = 3.392, SD = .224, N = 123) than for those shown the
Schizophrenia condition (M = 3.32, SD = .205, N = 128); F(1, 249) = 5.836, p = .016.
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H11: Will there be a difference in negative adjective extremity between the non-stigma
condition and the stigma conditions?
H11 asked the same question as H10 except concerning negative adjective extremity.
This was tested using a correlation table. Only body weight stigma was significantly
associated with negative adjective extremity (r = .232, p = .002). An independent-samples
one-way ANOVA further revealed that when participants used negative adjectives, those that
were exposed to the fat stimulus tended to report a higher level of extremity (M = 2.367, SD
= .828, N = 96) compared to those that were exposed to the thin stimulus (M = 1.929, SD =
1.016, N = 84); F(1, 178) = 10.163, p = .002. These results demonstrate that when
participants used negative adjectives, they tended to be more extreme for those evaluating the
fat stimulus compared to the thin stimulus.

H12: Will there be a significant difference in positive adjective emotionality between the
non-stigma condition and the stigma conditions?
H13: Will there be a significant difference in negative adjective emotionality between the
non-stigma condition and the stigma conditions?
H12 and H13 asked if stigma conditions of body weight and mental illness would be
significantly associated with positive and negative adjective emotionality. While no
significant associations were observed for negative adjective emotionality, a correlation table
showed that body weight stigma was significantly associated with positive adjective
emotionality (r = .516, p < .001). An independent-samples one-way ANOVA showed that
participants in the fat condition reported higher levels of emotionality in positive adjectives
78

(M = 5.670, SD = .700, N = 119) compared to participants exposed to the thin stimulus (M =
4.815, SD = .758, N = 95); F (1, 212) = 73.142, p < .001.

H14: Will the two outcome variables of adjective emotionality and affective scale measures
be significantly related to one another?
H14 asked if the two outcome variables of affective measures and adjective
emotionality would be significantly related to one another. This was tested with a correlation
matrix, shown in Table 7. Results showed that both measures were significantly correlated
with one another, and that this was true for both positive and negative scales respectively.
Positive affective scales and positive adjective emotionality were significantly associated (r =
.224, p = .004) as were negative affective scales and negative adjective emotionality (r =
.336, p < .001).

H15: Will any evaluative adjectives be significantly associated with the stigma and nonstigma conditions?
Lastly, H15 asked if any specific adjectives would be significantly associated with
any of the stigmatized conditions and their non-stigmatized counterparts. This was first tested
using a correlation table in order to identify significant relationships, and then followed up
with an independent-samples one-way ANOVA to determine the direction of the association.
Results showed that certain evaluative adjectives were significantly associated with body
weight and mental illness stigma. Beginning with body weight stigma, the thin body weight
stimulus was significantly associated with the use of the following positive adjectives:
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attractive, healthy, appealing, and desirable. The fat body weight stimulus was significantly
associated with the use of: awesome, joyful, exciting, positive, delightful, wholesome,
commendable, nice, cheerful and enjoyable. For negative adjectives, the thin body weight
condition was significantly associated with inappropriate, foolish, and boring. The fat body
weight condition was significantly associated with only one evaluative adjective: unhealthy.
Concerning mental illness stigma, no mental illness condition was significantly associated
with the following positive adjectives: attractive, healthy, and awesome. The Schizophrenia
condition was not significantly associated with any positive adjectives. Conversely, the no
mental illness condition was not significantly associated with any negative adjectives, while
the Schizophrenia condition was significantly associated with questionable, repulsive, unsafe,
and inappropriate. Since some evaluative adjectives were significantly associated with more
than one condition, checks for possible interaction effects were conducted. No interaction
effects were found, meaning these associations demonstrate independent effects. The full
correlation matrices can be found in Table 8, for negative adjectives, and Table 9 for positive
adjectives.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

The discussion will begin with an overview of what knowledge can initially be drawn
from the results in terms of how the results affect the overall goals of the project. Following
will be a more in-depth look at the theoretical and historical implications of the results. Here,
the theoretical implications will be discussed in terms of the first and second research aims
and the study assumptions. Next, the limitations of the study will be reviewed including
guidelines of how the limitations should inform future interpretations of the findings. Lastly,
the discussion will close with guidelines for future research following this project.

5.1 Initial Takeaways
The initial takeaways will summarize what these results mean within the context of
the overarching research goals for the project. The first goal was to identify possible
measurement practices and tools that could be useful towards the inter-categorical study of
stigma. This goal was tested through two main possibilities: the first in modifying existing
stigma measurement scales for perceived dangerousness, the second in adapting the
Evaluative Lexicon for evaluation of people and identities. Each of the results will be
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discussed in terms of their implications toward the project goal of finding possible measures
for inter-categorical study of stigma.
Inter-categorical research, according to Turan and colleagues (2019), prioritizes the
identification of similarities and differences between categories. Two theoretical tracts
toward this goal were followed: the first in pursuit of operationalizing an experience of fear,
threat, or danger on a cultural level. Slovic et al.’s (2004) research on risk and benefit
measurement, which utilized both cognitive and affective dimensions, was used as the
primary model. This resulted in the adaption of four sets of measures: positive and negative
affective scales, as well as positive and negative cognitive scales. Positive affective items
were pulled from Peter and Slovic (2007) and Smith (2019) to include seven Likert-scale
items including happy, friendly, safe, and secure. Negative affect items were pulled from the
same sources, and likewise included seven items such as upset, angry, disgust, and afraid.
Cognitive and logical measures were meant to expand beyond emotion and connect to
reasons and justifications other than feelings. Positive cognitive measures were
operationalized as perceived benefit. Two scales for perceived quality and perceived value,
developed by Dodds et al. (1991), included ten items total and were adapted from evaluating
object products to evaluating a person for this study. Negative cognitive measures were
operationalized as perceived threat and perceived danger. These items were pulled from
Smith et al. (2019) and Peters et al. (2004) to include items such as stigmatized, risky, and
predictable.
The first four of hypotheses predicted that across these four measures, stigma and
non-stigma stimuli would be rated according to their status as stigmatized or non82

stigmatized. That is, it was predicted that both stigma conditions were predicted to be rated
significantly more cognitively and affectively negative as was the non-stigma condition
predicted to be rated significantly more positively in both cognitive and affective scales. So,
the goal was two-fold: to not only demonstrate expected directions between stigma and nonstigma, but also to demonstrate parallel directions between two stigmatized conditions of
body weight and mental illness. The findings showed that, even when expanding the existing
measures to include cognitive and affective in addition to positive and negative dimensions,
the predictions were not supported for either goal. On the first task of demonstrating a
specific difference between stigma and non-stigma conditions, with stigma stimuli being
rated as more negative and less positive, the responses did not support such a relationship. In
the case of the body weight stigma, the stigmatized fat condition was rated more affectively
and cognitively positive than the thin condition, which was opposite to what was predicted.
The second task of demonstrating a significant association between two stigmatized
conditions also went unsupported. While these sets of measures produced some interesting
findings, no measures, cognitive or affective, performed similarly between body weight and
mental illness stigma conditions.
There are several implications to be drawn from these findings. Most relevant to the
theoretical underpinning is what these results mean for the relationship between perceived
threat and danger with the stigma process. In studies prior, several forms of danger and risk
posed by stigma have been presented as a possible variable involved in the stigma process,
and those findings were replicated in this study as well, but only for Schizophrenia stigma.
The measures deployed in this study have been adapted intentionally to be as broad and
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generalizable as possible in order to capture some shared elements of risk in two stigma
conditions. The results of this study suggest that risk and danger are not a shared element in
stigma but is instead specific to only certain types of stigma—in this case specific to stigma
of schizophrenia.
In the case of Schizophrenia stigma, previous findings that show increased levels of
perceived dangerousness of those with Schizophrenia were replicated in these analyses. This
was consistently the case that participants in the schizophrenia condition rated the stimulus as
evoking more negative feelings and rated as more dangerous than those rating the non-mental
illness stimulus. It was also consistent that these findings arose in the data for negative
affective measures and negative cognitive measures mainly, and less so for their positive
affective and cognitive counterparts. One exception to this was in examining the relationship
with positive cognitive measures such as perceived quality and the presence of schizophrenia
in the fat weight stimulus appeared to hinder participants ratings of perceived quality, when
in comparison those in the fat weight stimulus without Schizophrenia rated significantly
higher levels of perceived quality. It was in this test that an actual interaction effect was
observed between the two stigma conditions, where the fat stimulus appeared to elevate
ratings of perceived quality, but this boost was hampered by the addition of the
Schizophrenia stigma. While such a result is indeed interesting, the interaction effect did not
occur in similar analyses such as the relationship with positive affect. It appears to
persistently be the case that stigma relating to Schizophrenia is unique in ratings of
negativity, at least in comparison to body weight stigma. The relationship between stigma
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conditions and perceived quality produced interesting results that may be useful to further
examine in future studies.
Even though risk and danger may not constitute a shared stigma element, it may still
hold relevance in neighboring stigma topics other than Schizophrenia stigma. Appeals of
danger and risk are commonly observed in rhetoric relating to fat stigma, where threats to
personal health and the threat of glorifying obesity are indeed utilized. There is certainly a
question of how a stigma of fat body weight can exist if these threat appeals were not salient
enough to translate through into the survey results. One possible explanation for these
counterintuitive findings are that appeals to fear and danger are but one tool that can be
useful to stigmatization, but not necessarily required for the stigma process to operate. This
would implicate a number of things in stigma research: firstly, it necessitates the question
that arises if appeals to danger are but one tool, then what are others? It suggests that if some
tools are not completely necessary, but instead merely complimentary, then it becomes
relevant to ask what elements of stigmatization are more integral to the process? Possibly
most interesting of all, these results suggest that researchers look beyond perceptions of
danger in understanding stigma. In some cases, this will mean looking beyond the face value
of certain appeals that have become so common as to appear natural and taken for granted.
The interaction effects found while testing H3 are also worth discussing further.
Results demonstrated that respondents rated only the fat and no mental illness stimulus
condition with significantly higher levels of perceived quality, a positive cognitive measure.
While the intent of the test was to identify measures that could capture inter-categorical
stigma, it is interesting to observe this “sweet spot” effect. It was not due to the weight status
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or mental illness alone that respondents rated differing levels of perceived quality, otherwise
the Fat/Schizophrenia or Thin/No Mental Illness stimulus conditions would have received
similar changes in ratings. The implications of this will be discussed later, when detailing the
limitations of the study and the effect of possible confounders.
The other interaction effect of gender in the ratings of perceived quality was similarly
noteworthy. Here, participants rated the stimulus conditions significantly different depending
on their reported gender and the weight stigma stimulus. Male respondents in the thin weight
stimulus reported significantly higher perceived quality than male respondents in the fat
weight stimulus, meaning that their responses corresponded to the hypothesized direction of
perceived quality. In contrast, female respondents reported the opposite: female respondents
in the thin weight stimulus condition reported lower perceived quality that female
respondents in the fat weight stimulus. This interaction effect is notable because it is the only
test to have any kind of interaction effect, let alone two different forms of interaction effects.
The second tract involved reconceptualizing the way marks are used to substantiate a
stigma through symbolic, and not just bodily, means. Here, the application of evaluative
adjectives to not only individuals but also variably stigmatized individuals was a novel use of
the tool. The overall goal is in identifying possible measurement tools that can reliably
measure inter-categorical stigma topics along a single dimension. This goal was not realized
in the analyses involving adapted measures for perceived danger and benefit, however, the
analyses utilizing the Evaluative Lexicon (EL) and using symbolic marks in the form of
evaluative adjectives did provide promising insight towards inter-categorical stigma
measurement.
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Perhaps most intriguing is the finding that the EL indeed was found to measure
distinct elements of stigmatized identity stimuli. When simply positive and negative adjective
count was examined, results about the relationships between stigmatized identity conditions
were similar to the findings of the perceived risk and benefit analyses. There was no
relationship between any of the conditions with negative adjective count, and only the fat
weight stigma condition was significantly associated with more positive adjectives than the
thin weight condition. When more specific elements of those adjectives were examined,
however, different and distinct pictures began to emerge regarding the ratings of the different
stimuli.
Hypothesis 8 examined the levels of adjective valence, defined as the extent to which
an adjective implies positivity or negativity, within the negative adjectives used to rate the
stimulus. Here, the findings did not mirror prior results involving participants rating the fat
weight stigma condition as more positive. Rather, when negative adjectives were used, they
were significantly more negatively valenced than those negative adjectives used for the thin
weight condition. The result was the same when positive adjective valence was examined. Of
the positive adjectives used to describe the stimulus, those used to describe the thin weight
condition were significantly more positively valenced than those positive adjectives used to
describe the fat weight condition. What this means in context of the word count analysis is
that even though the fat weight condition was rated with a larger number of positive
adjectives than the thin weight condition, the quality of the adjectives used was markedly
different. Positive adjectives were more positive for the thin weight condition than the fat
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weight condition, and negative adjectives were more negative for the fat weight condition
than they were for the thin weight condition.
While the findings of the relationship between stigma condition and body weight
stigma are intriguing, they were not fully replicated with the mental illness conditions. There
was a similar association between mental illness and body weight stigma in terms of positive
adjective valence. When positive adjectives were used, they were more positively valenced
for the no-mental-illness condition than those positive adjectives used for the Schizophrenia
condition. Regarding negative adjective valence, however, there was no significant
relationship found regarding mental illness conditions and difference in negative adjective
valence. These findings are intriguing, especially considering the significant associations
observed between the Schizophrenia condition and the negative cognitive measures for
perceived risk and dangerousness. One would expect the negative adjective valence for the
Schizophrenia condition to mirror the increased ratings of perceived dangerousness,
however, the results demonstrated that this was not the case.
Hypotheses 10 and 11 addressed associations between stigma conditions and
adjective extremity, which is defined as the degree to which an adjective diverges from the
midpoint of positive and negative adjectives included in the EL. In this way, extremity is
related to valence because the extremity is calculated using the valence scores of an
adjective, but extremity differs from valence in that it describes the extent to which an
adjective represents an average positive evaluation or diverges from that average. When
participants chose positive adjectives, those in the thin weight condition chose more extreme
positive adjectives compared to those in the fat weight condition. Similarly, participants in
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the no-mental-illness condition chose more extreme positive adjectives than those in the
Schizophrenia condition.
Similar to the results for adjective valence, the relationship between stigma conditions
and negative adjective extremity was not replicated for both body weight and Schizophrenia
stigma. When negative adjectives were used, they were more extreme for participants in the
fat weight condition than for those in the thin weight condition. For the mental illness stigma
conditions, however, there was no significant association between negative adjective
extremity. Overall, what this means is that adjective valence and extremity were consistent in
measuring stigma conditions, but only when positive adjectives were examined, not negative
adjectives. This finding represents a novel contribution to the stigma literature because there
has not yet been examination of the way stigma topics are associated with positivity in
general. It is observable here in this study that at least two types of stigma, fat body weight
and schizophrenia, impact the valence and extremity of the positive adjectives participants
used to evaluate the stimulus.
The analysis of the relationship between the stigma conditions and adjective
emotionality resulted in some interesting findings. Adjective emotionality is defined as the
degree to which an adjective implies an emotional reaction as opposed to a more logical
reaction. It was a surprise to learn there was no significant association between any
conditions with negative adjective emotionality, especially with the Schizophrenia stimulus,
which was significantly associated with negative affective scale measures. Conceptually, the
negative affect scale and negative adjective emotionality were intended to measure similar
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constructs. The incongruency in their analysis suggests that they are not measuring similar
constructs.
Concerning positive adjective emotionality, the fat weight condition was significantly
associated with higher levels of positive emotionality than the thin weight condition. In order
to assess whether this finding corresponded to the positive affective scale utilized, a
correlation analysis found that the two variables were significantly associated, suggesting
that both tools were measuring a similar construct. This adds further validity to the
Evaluative Lexicon as a multidimensional tool that accurately measures emotionality.
The final hypothesis asked if any of the terms including in the Evaluative Lexicon
would be significantly associated with stigmatized conditions in comparison to nonstigmatized conditions. The findings of this correlation analysis both verified previous tests,
such as the number of positive and negative adjectives used, as well as revealed additional
details about the adjectives used. In line with the positive adjective count analysis, the fat
weight condition was significantly associated with the largest number of positive adjectives.
These included ten adjectives such as awesome, joyful, exciting, positive, delightful,
wholesome, commendable, nice, cheerful, and enjoyable. The only negative adjective that
was significantly associated with the fat weight condition was ‘unhealthy.’ Surprisingly, the
thin weight condition was significantly associated with four positive adjectives, one of which
being ‘healthy,’ and the other four including ‘attractive,’ ‘appealing,’ and ‘desirable.’ The
thin weight condition was associated with three negative adjectives: ‘inappropriate,’
‘foolish,’ and ‘boring.’
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The statistical as well as conceptual significance of the use of health in both positive
and negative evaluations of thin weight and fat weight should be noted. While there was an
observed push from participants to elevate the fat weight condition by using a larger number
of positive evaluative adjectives, it is noteworthy that this effort appeared to have limits. The
increased number of positive adjectives tended to be based more on emotionality and less on
evaluations dealing with appearance and desirability, and less still on those dealing with
positive health. The picture created by these adjectives demonstrates that there appears to be
fields of values surrounding evaluations of both stigmatized and non-stigmatized identities.
In the case of weight stigma, the use of health is likely an important value to investigate
further.
The adjectives that were significantly associated with Schizophrenia stigma revealed
a similar, yet distinct, pattern to that of body weight stigma. Here, the Schizophrenia
condition was not significantly related to any positive adjectives, and likewise the no-mentalillness condition was not significantly related to any negative adjectives. This means that the
only adjectives found to have a significant association with one of the conditions was
Schizophrenia and negative adjectives, as well as no-mental-illness and positive adjectives.
The four negative adjectives significantly associated with the Schizophrenia condition
included ‘questionable,’ ‘repulsive,’ ‘unsafe,’ and ‘inappropriate’. The three positive
adjectives significantly associated with the no-mental-illness condition included ‘attractive,’
‘healthy,’ ‘awesome.’ These results suggest that the value landscape involved in
Schizophrenia discourse is less contested than the values of body weight stigma, especially
where good and bad values are concerned. Here there was no observable push to evaluate
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the Schizophrenia condition positively, nor was there an effort to evaluate the no-mentalillness condition negatively.
Lastly, the collection of adjectives was compiled into a 2x2 table to examine the way
multiple stigma conditions were evaluated. When an adjective was significant for more than
one condition, additional correlation tests were conducted to test for possible interaction
effects. No interaction effects were found, which was most clearly visualized in the number
of adjectives that were significantly associated with both stigma conditions of Schizophrenia
and fat weight: zero. While further research is certainly necessary, this result suggests that
another limit of the identity value field may be that evaluation limits do not automatically
multiply or combine, unless the discursive landscape has established a new identity ‘peg’
with which evaluations can thus be placed. By this, meaning, in the current cultural
landscape there is no image, or ‘peg,’ readily available that represents a person who is both
fat and has Schizophrenia. Certainly, such people exist, but culturally this combination of
stigmas has no identity peg with which to collectively evaluate it. Compare this to a fat
woman identity, which involves at least two stigmas of being a woman and being fat, where
cultural images are more readily available and accessible to evaluate both stigmas
individually, as well as both together. Future research should continue this line of inquiry
into the limits of identity value discourse, and the ways in which evaluations adapt (or don’t
adapt) to intersecting stigma identities.
Although the results for this study were on the whole surprising, the implications for
stigma research were valuable. It is clear, firstly, that individual stigma topics have many
unique qualities that don’t transfer over easily to nearby stigma topics. Second, despite these
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distinctive qualities, the possibility of inter-categorical study of stigma remains within view,
just with its appearance different than initially imagined. Symbolic, instead of bodily, marks,
here operationalized using the evaluative elements in the Evaluative Lexicon, appear to be
the most promising avenue towards the goal of inter-categorical stigma research. With that
being said, perceived dangerousness will likely continue to be useful in stigma related to
certain mental illnesses, however in terms of inter-categorical stigma research, the role of
dangerousness may occupy the role of differences between stigma topics.

5.2 Theoretical Implications
The results of the present study have implications both in terms of the direct
hypotheses being tested and in terms of the theoretical ideas the tests were directed to inform.
As such, the impact of the tests on the theoretical ideas will be discussed. The two main
research questions of the project including the proposal of a shared cultural risk of stigma
and the proposal of shared verbal marks of stigma will be addressed first and second.
Following the research questions will include an assessment of the main assumptions of the
framework used in the study: the cultural identity theory perspective on stigma. Many of the
implications drawn will connect with the future recommendations for research that follows.
The first research question imagined the possibility of stigma evoking a shared sense
of cultural risk, of an imperative to manage the social status quo in terms of the dominant
ideologies, the results suggest a couple implications. While it is, of course, possible that the
design of the current study may not have attended properly to the nuances necessary to
measure such a perception of risk, the more likely conclusion is that perceptions of risk may
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not constitute an intercategorical shared quality of stigma. Given the significant association
between Schizophrenia and perceived danger within the survey, and the use of peril appeals
within the Twitter responses to the Gillette tweet, a possible implication is that perceived
danger is a conditional element within stigma communication, not a universal one. Such a
proposition has the potential to be problematic for facets of stigma research that derive their
theoretical tenets from socio-functional perspectives that argue stigma has originated
evolutionarily as a tool for group survival. While it is outside the scope of the current project
to contest such a theoretical basis, it is within the scope to suggest that such a basis alone is
likely not enough for the current study of stigma as it occurs presently.
The implications that can be drawn in terms of the second research question are in
line with those drawn from the theoretical assumptions, and tie-in to future theoretical
possibilities related to stigma research. The second research question was concerned with the
possibility of evaluative adjectives functioning as ‘verbal marks’ within the stigmatization
process. The results suggest that the answer to this question is: no, verbal marks do not
appear to be an intercategorical feature of stigmatization. Although negative elements of
evaluative adjectives sometimes were associated with the stigmatized conditions in the study,
this was never consistently the case, nor were such observations similar between the two
stigma conditions. An unexpected implication that can be drawn, however, has to do with the
use of positive evaluative adjective elements. Even despite the two confounding factors of
differences in facial expressions of the models, the division of adjectives, and possible
previous exposure to the Gillette tweet, the only variable that was consistently significantly
associated with stigmatization status across two stimulus types were the evaluative adjective
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elements of positive valence and positive extremity. And again, this was observed even when
the fat stimulus condition received larger amounts of positive adjectives compared to the thin
stimulus condition. Meaning that, even though the fat stimulus condition received more
positive adjectives overall, the quality of those positive adjectives were significantly less
positively valenced and less extreme than those used in the thin stimulus condition.
The implications of this finding are two-fold. First, the results add some validity to
Goffman’s description of ‘prestige-symbols’ and that the role of positive tools in addition to
negative may be a worthwhile avenue for future research. The second implication, however,
is that it may be appropriate for such future research to obtain some conceptual distance from
the stigma frameworks, at least initially. Instead, a starting framework of identity values
based in the racial, economical, political, and cultural history of a specific time and place
may be a better positioned vantage point of inquiry. This proposal will be described in
greater detail in the suggestions for future research, however the theoretical conclusion that
can be drawn generally is, the implicit restrictions observed on the adjective qualities used
were unexpected given that they were related to evaluative positivity, instead of negativity
when applied to two differing stigmatized stimuli. While some documentations of stigma
certainly mention a limitation of positive attributions, the focus remains mainly on the
relationship between stigma and negative attributions. The results of the present study
suggest that implicit positivity may constitute a more intercategorical role that first
previously thought.
In addition to evaluating the implications of both research questions, attention to the
main assumptions of a cultural identity framework of stigma draws implications as well.
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These assumptions included three main ideas: first, that stigmatization is not limited to the
stigmatization topics used for cataloging difference. Second, that stigma is understood as
two-role perspectives that are knowable to all persons instead of as categories of people that
can be sorted into stigmatized and non-stigmatized. Third, stigma can be understood as a tool
that is used for engaging with the identity values of a society. The results of the current
project have emphasized the level of consideration necessary to fully appreciate Yang et al.,
(2007), Kleinman & Hall-Clifford (2009), and Goffman’s (1963) methodological
recommendations.
For instance, both Goffman (1963) and Yang (2007) stress that stigma is not limited
to the experiences of individuals and that studying stigma requires an acknowledgment of the
multidimensional social properties of stigma that include elements such as history, politics,
religion, morality, and identity (Goffman, 1963, p. 127; Lawrence H. Yang, 2007, p. 981).
Furthermore, Yang et al., (2007) state that in measuring stigma, multiple perspectives and
measures are required in order to accommodate the multiplicity of vantage points, values,
and perspectives involved in various forms of stigmatization (2007, p. 1533). What this
means in terms of the current project is that adapting existing individualistic survey measures
are likely not sufficient to adequately, and in good confidence, study stigma, particularly in
terms of its social elements. Yang et al., (2007) and Kleinman & Hall-Clifford (2009)
explicitly recommend the use of ethnographic methods, such as participant observation and
in-depth interviews, to best study the multidimensionality of stigma. Use of these
methodological strategies are further supported by the results of the present study where the
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assumptions and questions could be queried directly from multiple sources and perspectives
instead of relying on implicit assumptions between the propositions and the study design.
Along the same lines, the use of multiple measures and perspectives in the
study of stigma are further based within a necessity to supplement existing stigma research
with the accompanying historical, political, and cultural information pertaining to
stigmatization. This means that stigma and marginalization must be understood within their
own contexts. For example, regarding medical stigmatization, the inconsistency in priorities
regarding funding anti-stigma initiatives when the intention is to increase certain behaviors,
such as mental health help seeking behaviors, and other priorities regarding the use of
stigmatizing practices when the intention is to decrease other behaviors, such as tobacco
smoking and fatness, needs to be addressed in historical, political, cultural, and financial
terms.
This is especially relevant to the results of the present study regarding the use of
“unhealthy” to describe the fat stimulus, and “healthy,” to describe the thin stimulus. Because
that observation is not derived solely from the attributions made by individuals within a
vacuum. Rather, it is both a reflection and participation in the cultural “play,” as Stuart Hall
would refer to it, of the dominant ideology of fatness as unhealthy, and therefore, as bad.
Such an understanding cannot be reached through individualistic survey response and is only
identifiable through a macro-lens that includes a variety of representations of fatness.
Although the present study did not include an analysis of the engagements with the Gillette
tweet on Twitter, nor did it analyze the journalistic reporting of the tweet, the tension
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between the perspectives of fat as bad and fat as good were evident from a cursory scan. The
intricacies of that tension likely remain to be gleaned from within those sources.
Overall, the two main research questions proposed by the present study were not met
with particularly promising results. Various forms of perceived risk and danger were not
evident across both stigma stimulus conditions, and the consistent use of negative marks in
the form of evaluative adjective elements were not observed either. Theoretically, this means
that attempts to form meaningful intercategorical observations among stigma conditions
using a cultural identity framework was not more effective than previously employed
frameworks toward this aim. Despite this, it remains possible to return to the assumptions
developed for a cultural identity theory application towards the study of identity values and
ask if there are other ways to use and test such a framework. What significance could such a
course of study hold, if not toward the intercategorical experimentation of stigma? Possible
answers to this question will be described in the future recommendations section.

5.3 Limitations
The current study suffered from several methodological and theoretical limitations
that should be considered while interpreting the results. Methodologically, several possible
confounding variables were identified that likely biased the responses. Appropriateness of the
survey design for multi-cultural and multilingual populations was not integrated into the
design phase of the project. Analysis of similar data in a naturalistic setting is also missing,
thereby limiting the extent to which these findings can be said to reflect the intended target
population of Twitter users. Theoretically, the study suffers from additional missteps in the
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form of the epistemological decisions made during theory building, along with likely
improper application of the theories used. The hope is that in naming these limitations they
can not only be avoided but may also be more proactively addressed in future research and
possibly even provided with tangible solutions.
Two confounding factors may have biased the response data. These include an
unaccounted difference in stimulus facial expressions and a lack of multi-lingual input
regarding study design. Regarding the stimuli bias, an unaccounted-for difference in facial
expressions of the models in the stimulus images may have obscured response data. Between
the two stimulus photos used of two individuals, one fat and one thin, the images were
chosen in order for both to be as similar to one another as possible, with the exception of the
experimental variable of interest: differing body weight. Both individuals are feminine, are
on a beach, and have their hands up in the air. There is one aspect between the two, however,
that was different and as a result possibly confounded the data that was collected. The fat
stimulus shows a woman who is smiling in an extreme way, while the thin stimulus is not
showing much of an emotional expression at all. This unintended difference between the two
conditions appears to be reflected in the data: participants rated the fat condition more
positively than the thin condition on a number of variables. Because of this, it is possible that
the data collected for this study does not have the level of internal validity necessary to assert
that the findings are likely due to difference in body weight stigmatization, and not difference
in facial expression.
The lack of consultation with multi-lingual individuals became apparent in the later
stages of the project as well. Of the 273 survey participants, only 68% (n= 184) selected that
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English was their first language. The remaining participants that selected English was not
their first language were then prompted to share what their first language was.
Approximately 10% of participants first language was Chinese Mandarin (n= 28), Spanish
was the first language for 4.4% of participants (n= 12), Arabic was the first language for
3.3% of participants (n= 9), and the remaining 14% of responses included languages such as
Hatian Creole (n= 5), Vietnamese (n= 5), Cantonese (n= 3), Korean (n= 3), French (n= 3),
Portuguese (n= 2), and Bangla (n= 2). The following languages were each answered by one
participant including Japanese, Polish, Somali, Nepalese, Italian, Gujarati, Greek, Dutch,
Bulgarian, Albanian, Cape Verdean Creole, Punjabi, and Funzhounese. This multilingual
aspect of the survey population was not adequately accounted for during survey design and
development, where aspects such as question wording, number of response scales, and visual
instruments could have been subjected to consultation and focus groups to determine if the
intentions of the survey were reflected in the design choices as they pertain to multilingual
speakers. This applies both in terms of language and culture where non-American non-white
cultural understandings were not adequately considered during the survey design stage.
Future research can address this limitation by incorporating cross-cultural and multilingual
consultants into the survey design process.
A second limitation of the project is that comparison data with a naturalistic setting is
missing from the analysis. The text associated with the Gillette Twitter thread would have
provided an opportunity to compare outcome measures with the survey sample. Ideally, the
evaluations used in both the comments, and comment re-tweets would be analyzed using the
Evaluative Lexicon in the same way the EL was used to analyze the evaluative adjectives
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chosen by the study participants. This would have not only allowed comparison between the
sample population and the target population, but it would have also provided necessary data
to demonstrate the strength of the ability of the EL to reliably measure the same construct
across different platforms. Due to time and technical restraints, this additional analysis was
not possible and those necessary actions were not taken. Although this is certainly a
limitation for the present study, it is also an accessible jumping off point for future research.
The third limitation is located at the conceptual level of the project in that the lessons
of intersectionality proposed by Crenshaw (1989) were not properly considered and
translated into the experimental process of the project. To review, Crenshaw (1989) argues
that the normative framework of antidiscrimination is insufficient and exclusionary because
it operates on an single-axis and unidirectional logic that regards the ‘normal,’ or
‘unoppressed’ in accordance with those that are the least disadvantaged. This top-down
approach to oppression thereby designates the least disadvantaged as the neutral state and
considers single issues of departure from that neutral state to qualify as oppression.
Therefore, the framework can recognize racism in Black men, and sexism in white women,
but it is unequipped to address the complexity of multiple intersecting identities, as Crenshaw
(1989) demonstrates in the problematic posed to the system with Black women. Of specific
relevance to this project’s limitations is the ways in which that same framework informs the
experimental model and how the present study did not sufficiently consider the adaptions
necessary for doing intersectional quantitative work. This was evident in the assumptions
made within the 2x2 design, that designated white women as the ‘pure’ and ‘default’

101

nonstigmatized state to then measure stigma such as mental illness and fatness. Crenshaw
(1989) discusses this in terms of the ‘hybridity’ that Black women represent when she states,
“Discrimination against a white female is thus the standard sex discrimination claim;
claims that diverge from this standard appear to present some sort of hybrid claim.
More significantly, because Black females’ claims are seen as hybrid, they sometimes
cannot represent those who may have ‘pure’ claims of sex discrimination”
(Crenshaw, 1989, p. 145).
This represents a very serious epistemological limitation of the project because in further
marginalizing Black women, the goal of discussing some type of intersectional stigma only
becomes more difficult to reach. Possible recommendations for future research regarding the
proper implementation of intersectionality will follow in the Future Research section.
Lastly, Link and Phelan (2001) note that in the previous decades have suffered from
a lack of people impacted by stigma performing the stigma research. This was partially
accomplished in the present study, where the principle researcher has Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder (OCD) and those personal life experiences of having mental illness were integrated
into the process of this study. However, at the same time, the work pulled from neighboring
fields such as fat studies and anti-racism work where membership was not applicable, and
therefore those experiences could not be applied other than through second-hand reference,
thereby replicating that same power imbalance. In terms of fat stigma, this is particularly
problematic because social scientists will often adopt and replicate fat stigma assumptions
simply because this knowledge is assumed to be common sense (Carlson et al., 2020;
Manokaran et al., 2020; Rothblum, 2018). Likewise, particularly in the context of racial
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America, it is not lost that the theoretical work of Stuart Hall and Kimberle Crenshaw was
pulled and used in a study that did not directly examine race beyond studying the white
identity as normal. It is a limitation that his work was applied in this way where race has
been pushed aside. Recommendations for avoiding this in future research will follow in more
detail in the following section, however for now a general recommendation is to engage in
research that practice challenging the validity of ‘pure’ experimental variables. Instead of
leaning inward toward what is easiest, future research should engage with the challenge of
reconciling variables that do not fit neatly into existing epistemological frameworks.
Taken together, the limitations of this study include the existence of confounding
factors within the study design and development, a lack of multi-cultural and multilingual
input during the survey design stage, a lack of comparison data from a naturalistic setting, a
lack of critical application of intersectional considerations to the experimental processes
itself, and risk of misrepresentation of marginalized identities due to the situational biases of
the researcher. It is recommended that these limitations be kept in mind bearing any
conclusions drawn from this study. Although there are several limitations that likely
impacted the quality of the data collected, they can also serve as examples and points of
inquiry for future research to engage with and address. In identifying these issues, it becomes
possible for future research to plan and accommodate the causes in order to avoid repeating
them.
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5.4 Contributions
While this study did suffer from limitations, there were also contributions offered to
the field of stigma research. Existing criticisms levied against the body of stigma research are
serious, and if they are to be dealt with, they will require novel theoretical approaches as well
as innovative applications of existing tools. The current study represents such an exercise in
approaching stigma from different perspectives. Specifically, this study proposed possible
methodological alternatives to address issues that arise in operationalizing theoretical
constructs into measurable variables such as self-stigma and public stigma. It also validated
methodological tools that have the adaptability to be used in settings beyond survey
participation and can be applied to new discursive landscapes applicable anywhere that
written adjectives are included. Theoretically, the project proposed possible complimentary
frameworks to be used in addition to studying stigma through individual attitudes and beliefs
to encapsulate the discursive struggle that goes into establishing, maintaining, and possibly
changing a stigma status quo. It also contributed a novel finding in suggesting that positive
evaluations may play a role in the stigmatization process in addition to negative evaluations.
Finally, the project demonstrated the versatility of a verified attitude measurement tool, the
Evaluative Lexicon, by showing that it can be used to measure discursive management
strategies in addition to attitudinal elements in evaluative adjectives.
The commonly referred to concepts such as self-stigma and public stigma, while
undeniably valuable and indispensable, when used exclusively have severe limitations to
theory building. They can be limiting first because they require study participants to be
sorted cleanly into ‘stigmatized’ and ‘non-stigmatized’ groups. This becomes problematic in
104

instances where a single participant may occupy multiple points of identity that are both
stigmatized and non-stigmatized, such as an individual who is white (non-stigmatized), a
woman (stigmatized), and have several comorbid mental illnesses (stigmatized). Secondly,
these concepts of self- and public stigma ask the participants to take a stance. By take a
stance, meaning, it asks the participant to first disclose their occupation of the stigma as well
as their politics within it. Rebecca Meisenbach’s Model of Stigma Management
Communication (SMC) made this implicit assumption explicit by establishing a typology for
an individual to locate themselves along two planes: the first asks them whether they agree or
challenge the current public status quo of a stigma, the second asks them whether they agree
or challenge that status quo as it applies to themselves (Meisenbach, 2010). While the SMC
is valuable in that it allows researchers to better understand the ways individuals confront and
manage stigma in their own lives, it still asks that respondents take a stance and disclose their
status. It would be worthwhile to also have access to tools that still measure stigma, but do
not require the participant to out themselves to the researchers as stigmatized or nonstigmatized.
The present study represents an attempt to measure stigma without imposing this
request onto the study participants. Here, the issue of pre-sorting study participants into
groups based on their membership or agreement with certain stigmas was sidestepped by
making the blanket assumption that all individuals are simultaneously potentially stigmatized
and non-stigmatized in an array of identity pegs, at continual, repetitious moments in time. In
other words, participants were assumed to be familiar with both stigmatized and nonstigmatized values and roles. Methodologically, this allowed for a wider range of responses
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that accommodates the complexity accompanying the engagement in cultural discourse
regarding which identities are valuable, and why and in what ways, and which identities are
not.
Certainly, further insight and debate is necessary to assess the overall impact of this
intention and execution. This approach is not meant to replace existing frameworks and
measurement tools because it too has limitations and drawbacks. For instance, there is the
possibility that moving too far away from the individual level may flatten those experiences
that affect the ways in which people engage with the identity values in a culture. Taken to its
extreme form, this direction could be mistaken for a ‘colorblind’ approach wherein the
standpoints of individual participants are lumped together and overlooked. That was a risk
the current project engaged with and may have fallen into. Even in failure, however, it is still
worth asking how to accommodate for complexity within stigmatized groups through
possible methodological techniques.
Along the same line, the current project presents a viable way to study stigma in
circumstances when it is not possible to ascertain the identities of participants, such as in
public online forums like Twitter. While it is undeniably useful to gather individual
information about the individuals in a study, the reality is that this is not always feasible or
possible. Increasingly and especially following the COVID-19 pandemic, much of public
discourse about cultural identity values occurs online using platforms that vary in the amount
of user information made available. Current popular social media platforms such as Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, WeChat, Tumblr, TikTok, Reddit, Youtube, Pinterest, and LinkedIn,
all vary in the amount of accurate personal information that they require and make publicly
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available about their users. As a result, the messages that continue to shape and manage
cultural identity values often do so on the basis of anonymity or uncertainty of identity. In the
cases of content becoming viral based on sheer volume of shares, retweets, likes, or views,
these elements that make messages more legitimate, pervasive, or convincing have less in
common with any given individual and almost seem to take on a life of their own. Current
stigma research does not have adequate tools for addressing these issues. The strategies
employed within the current study represent an attempt to bridge these gaps within the
research.
Next, stigma research has also struggled with accounting for the complexity of the
identity values of a given culture in a specific time, opting instead to use a top-to-bottom
approach of naming a stigma, and pulling out common stereotypes, attitudes, and beliefs
regarding it. When used exclusively, this approach limits stigma research to one attitudinal
dimension of a stigma and does not address other contributing elements, such as the
discursive struggle over a stigma, or resistance and transformative efforts within that same
space. The current project represents an attempt to measure and study those elements of
stigma not often examined with quantitative methods: the occupying discourse that arises in
addition to those stereotypes and attitudes. Identifying techniques to account for the
complexity surrounding cultural identity values is important because doing so accommodates
for the assumption that stigma is sustained by popular demand. In the current study, many of
the participants frequently made comments in the open text response items stating that they
did not want to judge a person solely on appearance. If this trend persists into future research,
it may have implications on understanding how stigmatization can continue if a large
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percentage of people state that stigmatizing is wrong, and don’t wish to stigmatize others in
their daily lives. Can the two, disagreeing with stigmatizing and supporting stigmatization,
coexist? The findings in the current study suggest that they might, and future research is
warranted to better understand such a relationship.
Also, regarding the complexity surrounding cultural identity values, the current study
demonstrated that the stigmatized topics operate not only in negative evaluations, but have
restrictions placed on positive evaluations as well. Previous work on stigma has thus far
mostly focused on the negative. In fact, the positive adjective valence and extremity were the
only two variables to demonstrate consistent findings between two stigmatized topics,
indicating that stigma may place similar restrictions on identity topics that vary less
qualitatively than the assignment of negative evaluations. This has implications for both how
stigma is understood, as well as for the ways anti-stigma initiatives can implement and
evaluate stigma reduction. It may be worthwhile to identify the positive evaluations that are
‘out of bounds’ when evaluating a stigma topic and ask questions regarding why that might
be, what it might look like to apply such adjectives, and what would happen if those
restrictions were breached. In the case of fat stigma and Schizophrenia stigma, what would it
look like to seriously evaluate a fat person as desirable, as healthy? What would it look like
to evaluate someone with Schizophrenia as safe? These are but a couple examples, the point
of which being: negative evaluations appear to only constitute a portion of stigmatization, not
the entire process.
Lastly, this project utilized the Evaluative Lexicon, a marketing tool designed for
item and product evaluation, in a new way that demonstrated its utility in evaluating
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identities and people in addition to objects. Although the EL was developed for the intention
of studying underlying attitudes, it can be argued that the tool works in the reverse as well,
that individuals use evaluative adjectives to shape and understand not just their attitudes and
feelings but also how they make sense of the world around them. Evaluative adjectives can
be considered two-fold, both reflective of inner attitudes and constructive of outer realities
simultaneously. This not only expands the methodological capabilities of the EL, it also puts
into practice what cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay have stated: that
advertising and marketing practices are directly involved in the identity values of a culture.
This is because, in addition to demonstrating the utility value of a product, advertisers must
also call upon the identity values of a culture in order to encourage their audiences to identify
with their brand or product.
Overall, what can be taken from this project is the capacity and inspiration to
interrogate a subject’s theoretical relationship to neighboring disciplines and concepts. While
the work of social psychologists in individual stigma related attitudes and beliefs are
indispensable, these findings only become more useful when they can be contextualized by
cultural and structural influences of stigma. The current project took risks in using
unconventional tools in pursuit of this goal. And while certain aspects of the study certainly
faltered, a main takeaway is that there appears to be more to stigma than just attitudes, and
that these elements appear to be quantifiable, and thus, knowable through research.
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5.5 Future Research
The future research recommendations presented here will cover a variety of directions
including measurement, methodology, and stigma. Future directions for the Evaluative
Lexicon include potential uses of the tool for identity related adjectives, and possibly for
stigma specific labels as well. Stigma research has many possible threads to follow, including
the examination of Goffman’s prestige symbols, the use of marketing and branding concepts
to further illustrate those prestige symbols, as well as exploring the relationship between
logic-based attributions and the stigma topics they belong to. Within a larger picture,
however, there are also recommended steps that should be taken foremost: first to integrate
the circuit of culture into study designs of stigma, and most importantly to begin a historical
account of stigma policy and research. In this manner the recommendations will begin more
focused and will then expand outward in scope as they move along.
Beginning with some recommended directions for the Evaluative Lexicon, the current
project selected a response-based survey format for the collection of data to draw
comparisons between the present study and previous stigma research, the majority of which
has been survey-based. Much more work can be done if the field of analysis were to expand
to include a wider range of evaluative tools that people use to shape and understand their own
culture. Mediums such as social media platforms, public policy, academic journals, grant
writing, and mass media channels represent only a few of the locations the management of
identity values take place. One benefit of the Evaluative Lexicon is that it allows researchers
to transition between communicative levels because it is measuring practices are common to
all, in the form of evaluative adjective elements. Especially now in 2020 and 2021, due to the
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COVID-19 pandemic, when more communication is done remotely or through the assistance
of communicative channels, the analysis of written, recorded, electronic, public
communication becomes that much more fruitful. Identity values are extremely valuable to a
culture, one might even say they are intrinsic to the functioning of a culture. Therefore, the
management of those values can take place almost anywhere, far beyond the scope of
individual response surveys. Research on stigma and the like can adapt to this. A new
division focused on identity value management in marketing and advertising alone may turn
up surprising and meaningful findings.
Through the current project, the Evaluative Lexicon has been demonstrated to
effectively measure aspects of people and identity-based evaluations. This was done despite
the original word-bank used only including terms that applied to objects. The adjectives
included in the EL bank were required to meet a number of specifications in order to be
included (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015). These specifications contained requirements such as,
they needed to be naturally evaluative, be obviously positive or negative, and to be broadly
applicable across a wide variety of stimuli (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015). Adjectives that applied
only to the evaluation of people, such as ‘honest,’ were not included because they were not
broad enough (Rocklage & Fazio, 2015, p. 216). Future research could explore the possibility
of additional versions of the EL, perhaps a generalized bank and a person-based list.
Continuing off the previous recommendation, stigmatized topics occupy interesting
points in a cultural value system in that their potential to hold multiple or hidden meanings
may be more complex than typical adjectives. It is also worth raising the question of whether
similar adjectives carry the same elemental loads when they are applied to various
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stigmatized objects and identities. Furthermore, it may be worthwhile to study the evaluative
baggage of stigma labels to gain a better understanding of what role evaluative adjectives
play when they are being applied to a historically stigmatized identity. Addressing questions
such as these are a call to investigate the representative breadth of the Evaluative Lexicon as
a tool. While the current study demonstrated that the EL has the capacity to evaluate
stigmatized identities in addition to commercial objects, the possible nuance, strengths, and
limitations of the tool remain to be known.
An aspect of Goffman’s work that was intended to be incorporated into the current
project, but was ultimately dropped, was his mention of status and prestige symbols, which
he noted contrast from stigma symbols (Goffman, 1963, pp. 43–44). Due to lacking adequate
insight into how stigma and status symbols are evoked and managed in relation to one
another, this study was not successful in operationalizing them into the experimental design.
As was the realization here, it appears that there is a meaningful difference between an
identity simply being non-stigmatized and an identity being idolized/apart of prestige and
status symbolization. The line of inquiry that was not attended to here is therefore presented
as directions for future research. First, explore whether idolized points are subject to similar
evaluative processes as stigmatized points. Specifically, are there limits to the valence,
extremity, and emotionality in the evaluative adjectives used to position idolized identities
similar to the way limits appeared for stigmatized identities in this study? Second, ask if the
presence of ‘mixed’ identities, as Goffman phrased it, affect the evaluative identity value
process. The present study utilized a between-subjects design and therefore participants only
evaluated each stimulus independent of the other stimulus conditions. Although the present
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study did not find consistent associations between perceived danger and stigma conditions, it
is possible that this may not remain the case in mixed situations. Third, the qualitative
categorization of idolized identities may likely differ from stigmatized categorization.
Despite this, there remains the possibility that such cataloguing may compliment stigma
research, or also lead to alternative insights. For example, national and international media
celebrities and heroes (both fictional and non-fictional) may represent one form of prestige
identity on a cultural scale. On a more local level, however, prestige symbolization may
manifest situationally. This is one area of research that needs to begin with existing work on
anti-racism, anti-capitalism, and related anti-oppression frameworks because these explicitly
account for the power dynamics that include the privileged and worshiped in addition to the
exploited. It is an area that stigma research is not able to address independently.
Cultural identity research may have more to learn from the field of marketing
research, particularly in work pertaining to brand creation and management. While it would
be overly simplistic to say that a given brand is equivalent to any given cultural identity or
vice versa, at the same time the similarities between the two concerning cultural value
management suggest there may be insight to be gained regarding stigmatization, stigma, and
prestige marks. This body of work may be particularly insightful into questions about the
symbolization of idolization and the identity values that are held up, rather than stigmatized
(Bhat & Reddy, 1998). Furthermore, the existing work pertaining to the relationship
consumers form between themselves (their self-concept) with products and brands may guide
future questions regarding how individuals utilize a field of cultural identity values within
their own lives (Sirgy, 1982; Solomon, 1983).
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One noteworthy but incomplete observation has implications for the logic-based
connections between evaluative attributions and appeals used to justify their categorization.
For example, in the current study, measures of perceived danger were not significantly
associated for both stigma topics. Despite this, individual appeals for danger of obesity were
still evoked in both the study open-ended responses as well as the Gillette Twitter thread.
This in combination with fat studies background information forms a puzzling suggestion
that, despite attribution theory drawing connections between emotions and specific
attributions such as dangerousness and responsibility, that logical and evidenced connections
between the stigma topic and the attribution, although they may develop, are not required for
the process to occur. Meaning, providing evidence to the contrary of established identity
values (such as stereotypes), may be missing the point because the process never required a
logical connection in the first place. Similarly, the connection may only be necessary at
specific levels of discourse such as in policy making and funding initiatives. Further research
is needed to better explore this possibility and follow-up questions posed by the present study
ask if the common factor between stigma topics is not the reasoned justifications propping up
the difference, and instead is the elements utilized to shape the evaluation of the difference,
such as adjective valence and adjective extremity.
Future research will also need to not focus solely on communicative expressions of
stigma and will need to expand to evaluate the connected material variables as well. For
example, a well-known media production company may produce material that positively
evaluates relevant historically marginalized identities, but it will be valuable to ask questions
pertaining to the ways such messages compare to hiring practices, wage inequality, instances
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of discrimination, and the like. Communication scholars Justin Lewis and Sut Jhally (1998)
refer to this distinction as representing culturally contextual, versus simply textual,
approaches to studying media literacy. Media literacy, defined as “the ability to access,
analyze, evaluate, and communicate messages in a wide variety of forms,” has become a
popular educational tool for childhood education, but it’s applicability to media research is
relevant here as well (Aufderheide, 1993; Hobbs, 1999, p. 16). Lewis and Jhally (1998) argue
that media messages should not be analyzed independently from the conditions that created
them, and instead “should be analyzed as sets of institutions with particular social and
economic structures that are neither inevitable nor irreversible” (Lewis & Jhally, 1998, p.
109). An important tool towards this end, according to them, is the circuit of cultural
production developed by Du Gay and colleagues (Du Gay et al., 1997). The circuit of culture
is a theoretical model that details five major cultural processes and emphasizes the
articulations, or “the process of connecting disparate elements together to form a temporary
unity,” that take place between them (Du Gay et al., 1997, p. 3). These five elements include
(1) representation, (2) identity, (3) production, (4) consumption, and (5) regulation (Du Gay
et al., 1997, p. 3). Future research on stigma and cultural identity values will need to address
the articulations between these elements and research beyond textual representations of
identity values to incorporate contextual approaches as well.
A historical examination of the field of stigma research and initiatives is necessary to
contextualize current research findings. This includes accounts of the legacy of stigma
research and policy in America and abroad, including accounts of the anti- as well as prostigma initiatives. Anti-stigma research will need to specifically pertain to topics such as the
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designation of government projects, research, and funding, the popularization of the concept
related to Goffman’s 1963 book, and the collaboration (or lack thereof) with relevant
movements including mental health advocacy, feminism, anti-racism, LGBTQA rights, and
fat studies. Such an account will need to also address the contradictions within the subject
which include stigmatization being utilized as a public health policy for at least two health
topics of obesity and tobacco cigarette smoking. Stigma research is frequently presented
ahistorically and apolitically, despite both history and political factors playing important
roles in the funding, prioritizing, and legitimizing which forms of stigma are rendered valid
and in what ways. Developing a historical examination of the stigma industry may be an
effective method towards addressing this discrepancy within the literature. Such a project
may also prove to be illuminative of the uses and roles of the stigma concept in research,
public policy, and popular culture.
Overall, the field of stigma research has much work left to do in terms of
multidisciplinary goals toward understanding stigma. Luckily, there are many resources
available to aid in this goal. Methodologically, further exploration of the use of evaluative
adjectives and their constitutive elements of valence, extremity, and emotionality through the
Evaluative Lexicon may help researchers understand mass communication strategies of
stigma communication. Theoretically, it will be important to elucidate the relationship
between attributions of dangerousness and responsibility, as well as further explore what
Goffman may have meant in mentioning prestige symbols. Lastly, a historical examination of
the stigma industry is needed in order to further connect and contextualize the research that
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has been produced over the past 60 years. These tasks will not be easy, but they are
nevertheless worth striving towards.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Erving Goffman, in illustrating the effect of identity-values of a society, likens them
to shadows. He states,
“The general identity-values of a society may be fully entrenched nowhere, and yet
they can cast some kind of shadow on the encounters encountered everywhere in
daily living.” (Goffman, 1963, pp. 128–130).
The imagery almost gives the impression of culture as a sort of ghost that is may be always
present but never quite perceptible. Likewise, culture as always felt, but difficult to pin down,
especially within quantitative research. Perhaps, this may still be the case. This project,
however, interrogated the possibility of ‘grasping the shadow’ and asked if it might be viable
to conceive of stigma in terms of cultural identity theory. This was done through two main
research questions: first, by testing a modified measure of perceived risk and second, by
using the Evaluative Lexicon to test for significant associations between verbal marks and
stigmatized subjects. While the results were not as fruitful as anticipated, there is still value
in describing what doesn’t work, or as Hall would call, difference, within these theoretical
propositions. There are now many recommended future research directions that may be
promising for stigma and cultural identity research.
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Table 1: Perceived Risk and Benefit Measure Taxonomy

Cognitive

Affective

Perceived Risk
Perceived Danger (Smith et al.,
2019)
1. Dangerous Decision
2. Unpredictable Decision
3. No More dangerous than
any others
4. Natural to perceive as
dangerous
5. Wouldn’t be able to tell
what the final product
will be
Perceived Risk (Peters et al.,
2004)
1. Risky
2. Acceptable
3. Disgraceful
4. Stigmatized
5. Predictable
(Peters & Slovic, 2007)
1. Upset
2. Angry
3. Annoyed
4. Disgust
5. Afraid
(Smith et al., 2019)
1. Threatened
2. Uneasiness
3. Ill at ease
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Perceived Benefit
Perceived Quality (Dodds et al., 1991)
1. Reliable
2. Workmanship
3. Very Good Quality
4. Dependable
5. Durable/Consistent

Perceived Value (Dodds et al., 1991)
1. Very good value for the money
2. Very economical / Uneconomical
3. Considered a good buy
4. Price very
Acceptable/Unacceptable
5. Appears to be a bargain
(Peters & Slovic, 2007)
1. Happy
2. Friendly
3. Enthusiastic
4. Love
5. Excited
(Smith et al., 2019)
1. Safe
2. Secure
3. Sure of myself

Table 2: Participant Demographics
n
Survey Part

M

SE

Percent

273
1

140

51.3%

2

133

48.7%

Setting

273
Advertising

141

51.6%

Doctor Office

132

48.4%

Weight
Condition

273
Thin

137

50.2%

Fat

136

49.8%

Mental Illness
Condition

273
No Schizophrenia

133

48.7%

Schizophrenia

140

51.3%

Manipulation

273
Fat – No MI

62

22.7%

Thin – No MI

71

26%

Fat – Schizophrenia

74

27.1%

Thin – Schizophrenia

66

24.2%

Gender

273
Female

171

62.6%

Male

99

36.3%

Nonbinary

3

1.1%

White

108

39.6%

Asian

81

29.7%

Black

49

17.9%

Race

120

Other

31

11.4%

Mixed Race

6

2.2%

Missing

12

4.4%

Ethnicity

273
Hispanic or Latino
Not Hispanic or
Latino
Missing

First Language

35

12.8%

203
35

74.4%
12.8%

273
English

184

67.8%

Chinese Mandarin

28

10.3%

Spanish

12

4.4%

Arabic

9

3.3%

Haitian Creole

5

1.8%

Vietnamese

5

1.8%

Cantonese

3

1.1%

Korean

3

1.1%

French

3

1.1%

Portuguese

2

0.7%

Other

16

5.9%

Missing

2

0.7%

Age

20.64

.187

5

18-23

248

90.8%

24-29

11

4%

30-45

8

2.9%

Missing

6

2.2%
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Table 3: Correlations Among Positive Adjective Valence
Measures

1

2

1. Weight Condition

--

.

.067

--

-.137*

-.151*

2. Mental Illness Condition
3. Positive Adjective Valence

3

--

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Listwise N=251

Table 4: ANOVA Among Positive Adjective Valence
Condition

Value

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

p

Partial η2

Weight
Condition

.221

4.760

1

249

.030

.019

Mental Illness
Condition

.270

5.841

1

249

.016

.023

Table 5: Correlation Matrix Among Positive Adjective Extremity
Measures
1. Weight Condition
2. Mental Illness Condition
3. Positive Adjective Extremity

1

2

3

-.067

--

-.137*

-.151*

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Listwise N=251
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--

Table 6: ANOVA Among Positive Adjective Extremity
Value

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

p

Partial η2

Weight
Condition

.221

4.756

1

249

.030

.017

Mental Illness
Condition

.270

5.836

1

249

.016

.022

Condition

Table 7: Correlation Matrix among Affective Scales and Adjective Emotionality
Measures

1

2

1. Positive Adjective Emotionality

--

2. Negative Adjective Emotionality

-.041

--

3. Positive Affective Scale

.224**

-.047

--

4. Negative Affective Scale

-.069

.336**

-.003

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Listwise N=165

123

3

4

--

Table 8: Correlation Matrix Among Negative Adjective Associations
Measures

1

1. Weight Condition

--

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2. Mental Illness
Condition

.057

--

3. Imperfect

-.029

-.161*

--

4. Unhealthy

.556**

.015

-.133

5. Inappropriate

-.202*

.171*

-.085 -.209**

6. Foolish

-.219**

.073

-.024

-.073

.283**

--

7. Boring

-.160*

.011

-.099

-.160*

-.104

.002

--

8. Repulsive

.066

.205**

-.123

.103

.196*

.149

.062

--

9. Unsafe

.067

.204*

-.007

.109

-.061

.048

-.050

.159*

9

---

**. Pearson Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Pearson Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Listwise N=158

124

--

Table 9: Correlation Matrix: Positive Adjective Associations
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APPENDIX
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY EVALUATION INSTRUMENT

[Screen 1]
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. Please be reminded that this survey is
anonymous, so please do not include any names or information that could be used to identify
yourself or others in your responses.

Vignette A: Modeling Scenario
For this survey, imagine that you are the Director of Advertising for a well-known brand.
It is part of your job to review applications and oversee the decision process for deciding
which professional models will be featured in the company's print advertisements.
Today your assistant has delivered a folder containing an application that was recently
submitted.
On the following pages, please carefully look over this application then answer the following
questions.

Vignette B: Patient Scenario
For this survey, imagine that you are the Head Physician for a well-known medical practice.
It is part of your job to review applications and oversee the decision process for accepting
new patients.
Today your assistant has delivered a folder containing a patient application that was recently
submitted.
On the following pages, please carefully look over this application then answer the following
questions.
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[Screen 2]
Applicant Name: Rachel Johnson
Age: 31
Height: 5' 7"
Preexisting Conditions:
${e://Field/Health_Conditions}
Weight: 250 lbs

Applicant Name: Rachel Johnson
Age: 31
Height: 5' 7"
Preexisting Conditions:
${e://Field/Health_Conditions}
Weight: 115 lbs

What is your initial reaction to Rachel's photo?
[Screen 3]
[Image Displayed]
Would you HIRE Rachel for the modeling position?
Yes
No

Please explain why you answered Yes or No to the question above:
[Text Box]
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[Screen 4]
[Image Displayed]
The following choices show a selection of NEUTRAL adjectives.
Please select any of the adjectives that you feel accurately describe Rachel.
If more than one adjective applies, multiple selections can be made.
If none of the adjectives apply, leave them blank and click "Next."
Neutral
Mediocre
Average
Satisfactory
Okay
Acceptable
Adequate
Reasonable
Tolerable
Questionable

[Screen 5]
[Image Displayed]
The following choices show a selection of NEGATIVE adjectives.
Please select any of the adjectives that you feel accurately describe Rachel.
If more than one adjective applies, multiple selections can be made.
If none of the adjectives apply, leave them blank and click "Next.
Hateful
Bad
Worthless
Stupid
Repulsive
Irritating
Terrible
Angering
Dreadful
Offensive
Gruesome
Annoying
Awful
Unsafe
Horrible
Inferior
Sickening
Saddening
Terrifying
Upsetting
Disgusting
Unhealthy
Useless
Dislikable
Depressing
Troublesome
Appalling
Inappropriate
Disturbing
Sorrowful
Undesirable
Ridiculous
Negative
Foolish
Dangerous
Boring
Harmful
Objectionable
Frightening
Imperfect
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[Screen 6]
[Image Displayed]
The following choices show a selection of POSITIVE adjectives.
Please select any of the adjectives that you feel accurately describe Rachel.
If more than one adjective applies, multiple selections can be made.
If none of the adjectives apply, leave them blank and click "Next”
Magnificent
Healthy
Excellent
Cheerful
Awesome
Beneficial
Fantastic
Enjoyable
Perfect
Desirable
Amazing
Helpful
Outstanding
Favorable
Wonderful
Superior
Fabulous
Pleasant
Lovable
Relaxing
Great
Worthwhile
Very Good
Likable
Wise
Appealing
Terrific
Useful
Joyful
Good
Exciting
Wholesome
Smart
Calming
Positive
Commendable
Delightful
Nice
Valuable
Safe
Attractive
Agreeable

[Screen 7]
[Image Displayed]
Rachel makes me feel: [Not At All (1) – Very Much (7)]
Upset
Happy
Angry
Friendly
Annoyed
Enthusiastic
Disgusted
Loving
Afraid
Excited
Threatened
Safe
Uneasy
Secure
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[Screen 8]
[Image Displayed]
The decision to hire Rachel for the modeling job would be: [Not At All (1) – Very Much (7)]
Dangerous
A very good value
Unpredictable
Very economical
A Risk
A bargain
Safe
A good business decision

[Screen 9]
[Image Displayed]
Rachel Seems: [Not At All (1) – Very Much (7)]
Risky
Predictable
Acceptable
Reliable
Disgraceful
Good
Stigmatized
Dependable
Bad
Consistent
Moral
Good Work Ethic

[Screen 10]
[Image Displayed]
Would you REJECT Rachel for the modeling position?
Yes
No

Please explain why you answered Yes or No to the question above:
[Text Box]

[Screen 11]
[Control Measure]
Great, thank you for evaluating Rachel!
In order to get a better understanding of your evaluation report, please fill out the following
items as if you were assessing yourself:
I make people feel: [Not At All (1) – Very Much (7)]
Upset
Happy
Angry
Friendly
Annoyed
Enthusiastic
Disgusted
Loving
Afraid
Excited
Threatened
Safe
Uneasy
Secure
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If I were the applicant, the decision to accept me would be: [Not At All (1) – Very Much (7)]
Dangerous
Good Value
Unpredictable
Economical
A risk
A Bargain
Safe
A Good Business Decision
To other people, I think I seem: [Not At All (1) – Very Much (7)]
Risky
Predictable
Acceptable
Reliable
Disgraceful
Good
Stigmatized
Dependable
Bad
Consistent
Moral
Good Worker

[Screen 12]
[Demographics]
Lastly, for the following items, please provide some information about yourself.
Gender:
Male
Female

Race
American Indian
Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

Ethnicity
Hispanic or Latino

Nonbinary
Other

White
Black
Other

Not Hispanic or Latino

Age:
[Text Box]

Is English your first language?
Yes

No
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If “No,” what is your first language?
[Text Box]
[Screen 13]
[Survey Conclusion]
Thank you for participating thus far in this study! You still have the ability to change your
mind and decide not to participate at this point. Your responses will not be saved and
recorded until you select the "Next” button at the bottom of this page. Please remember that
if you choose to submit your responses, due to the anonymous nature of the survey, it will
not be possible to locate your responses in the future if you change your mind and ask to
withdraw them.
Before submitting, please share your opinion about what you thought of this survey. This can
include any thoughts you had while taking it, if you thought something didn’t make sense, or
if there was something you particularly liked. This feedback may be helpful if the survey
needs to be revised for future studies.
[Text Box]

Are you participating in this survey to receive course credit?
If yes is selected, you will be redirected to a separate page where you can fill out your class
information to be submitted to this professor. This information will not be linked to your
survey responses.
If you are not participating to receive course credit, you can leave this item blank
Yes, I’m participating for course credit

[Submit]

133

REFERENCES
Abu-Odeh, D. (2014). Fat stigma and public health: A theoretical framework and ethical
analysis. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 24(3), 247–265.
Ashforth, B. E., & Kreiner, G. E. (1999). “How can you do it?”: Dirty work and the
challenge of constructing a positive identity. Academy of Management Review, 24(3),
413–434.
Aufderheide, P. (1993). Media Literacy. A Report of the National Leadership Conference on
Media Literacy. ERIC.
Bayer, R. (2008). Stigma and the ethics of public health: Not can we but should we. Social
Science & Medicine, 67(3), 463–472.
Bell, K., Salmon, A., Bowers, M., Bell, J., & McCullough, L. (2010). Smoking, stigma and
tobacco ‘denormalization’: Further reflections on the use of stigma as a public health
tool. A commentary on Social Science & Medicine’s Stigma, Prejudice,
Discrimination and Health Special Issue (67: 3). Social Science & Medicine, 70(6),
795–799.
Bhat, S., & Reddy, S. K. (1998). Symbolic and functional positioning of brands. Journal of
Consumer Marketing.
Bos, A. E. R., Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D., & Stutterheim, S. E. (2013). Stigma: Advances in
Theory and Research. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 35(1), 1–9.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2012.746147

134

Bowleg, L. (2012). The problem with the phrase women and minorities: Intersectionality—
An important theoretical framework for public health. American Journal of Public
Health, 102(7), 1267–1273.
Brewis, A. A., Wutich, A., Falletta-Cowden, A., & Rodriguez-Soto, I. (2011). Body norms
and fat stigma in global perspective. Current Anthropology, 52(2), 269–276.
Brewis, A., SturtzSreetharan, C., & Wutich, A. (2018). Obesity stigma as a globalizing health
challenge. Globalization and Health, 14(1), 1–6.
Brinkley-Rubinstein, L. (2015). Understanding the effects of multiple stigmas among
formerly incarcerated HIV-positive African American men. AIDS Education and
Prevention, 27(2), 167–179.
Burmeister, J. M., & Carels, R. A. (2014). Weight-related humor in the media: Appreciation,
distaste, and anti-fat attitudes. Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 3(4), 223.
Carlson, J., Leek, C., Casey, E., Tolman, R., & Allen, C. (2020). What’s in a name? A
synthesis of “allyship” elements from academic and activist literature. Journal of
Family Violence, 35(8), 889–898.
Carr, D., & Friedman, M. A. (2005). Is obesity stigmatizing? Body weight, perceived
discrimination, and psychological well-being in the United States. Journal of Health
and Social Behavior, 46(3), 244–259.
Cerullo, M. (2019). Gillette image of plus-size model in bikini sparks outrage. CBS News.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gillette-bikini-photo-featuring-plus-size-modelsparks-outrage/

135

Corrigan, P. (2004). How stigma interferes with mental health care. American Psychologist,
59(7), 614.
Corrigan, P., Markowitz, F. E., Watson, A., Rowan, D., & Kubiak, M. A. (2003). An
Attribution Model of Public Discrimination Towards Persons with Mental Illness.
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 44(2), 162. https://doi.org/10.2307/1519806
Corrigan, P. W., Morris, S. B., Michaels, P. J., Rafacz, J. D., & Rüsch, N. (2012).
Challenging the Public Stigma of Mental Illness: A Meta-Analysis of Outcome
Studies. Psychiatric Services, 63(10), 963–973.
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201100529
Corrigan, P. W., & Penn, D. L. (2015). Lessons from social psychology on discrediting
psychiatric stigma. Stigma and Health, 1(S), 2–17. https://doi.org/10.1037/23766972.1.S.2
Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.
University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989, 139.
Das, V., Kleinman, A., Lock, M. M., Ramphele, M., & Reynolds, P. (2001). Remaking a
world: Violence, social suffering, and recovery. Univ of California Press.
Di Filippo, E. (2019). Gillette’s latest ad exposes everything that’s wrong with how we think
about health. Yahoo Canada Style. https://ca.style.yahoo.com/gillettes-latest-adexposes-everything-thats-wrong-with-how-we-think-about-health-194602688.html

136

Dodds, W. B., Monroe, K. B., & Grewal, D. (1991). Effects of price, brand, and store
information on buyers’ product evaluations. Journal of Marketing Research, 28(3),
307–319.
Du Gay, P., Hall, S., Janes, L., Madsen, A. K., Mackay, H., & Negus, K. (1997). Doing
cultural studies: The story of the Sony Walkman. Sage.
E. Ashforth, B., E. Kreiner, G., A. Clark, M., & Fugate, M. (2007). Normalizing dirty work:
Managerial tactics for countering occupational taint. Academy of Management
Journal, 50(1), 149–174.
Evans-Polce, R. J., Castaldelli-Maia, J. M., Schomerus, G., & Evans-Lacko, S. E. (2015).
The downside of tobacco control? Smoking and self-stigma: A systematic review.
Social Science & Medicine, 145, 26–34.
Fanon, F. (1963). The wretched of the earth. Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre. Trans. Constance
Farrington. New York: Grove Press.
Gillette Venus. (2019, April 4). Venus is committed to representing beautiful women of all
shapes, sizes, and skin types because ALL types of beautiful skin deserve to be
shown. We love Anna because she lives out loud and loves her skin no matter how
the “rules” say she should display it

[Tweet]. @GilletteVenus.

https://twitter.com/GilletteVenus/status/1113891573538799617
Gillette’s new Venus advert sparks fat phobia debate with choice of model. (2019, April 8).
ITV News. https://www.itv.com/news/2019-04-08/gillette-venus-twitter-anna-obrienfatphobic-comments-trolls

137

GMA Team. (2019, April 11). Gillette posted a photo of a plus-size model and Twitter
couldn’t handle it. ABC7 New York. https://abc7ny.com/5242679/
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Touchstone.
Graham, H. (2012). Smoking, stigma and social class. Journal of Social Policy, 41, 83.
Griffiths, K. M., Carron-Arthur, B., Parsons, A., & Reid, R. (2014). Effectiveness of
programs for reducing the stigma associated with mental disorders. A meta-analysis
of randomized controlled trials. World Psychiatry, 13(2), 161–175.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20129
Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post‐structuralist
debates. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 2(2), 91–114.
Hall, S. (1986). The problem of ideology-Marxism without guarantees. Journal of
Communication Inquiry, 10(2), 28–44.
Hall, S. (1989). Cultural identity and cinematic representation. Framework: The Journal of
Cinema and Media, 36, 68–81.
Hanisch, S. E., Twomey, C. D., Szeto, A. C. H., Birner, U. W., Nowak, D., & Sabariego, C.
(2016). The effectiveness of interventions targeting the stigma of mental illness at the
workplace: A systematic review. BMC Psychiatry, 16(1), 1.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-015-0706-4
Hartwell, S. (2004). Triple Stigma: Persons with Mental Illness and Substance Abuse
Problems in the Criminal Justice System. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 15(1), 84–
99. https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403403255064

138

Hegner, R. (2000). Dispelling the Myths and Stigma of Mental Illness: The Surgeon
General’s Report on Mental Health. National Health Policy Forum.
https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_centers_nhpf/56
Hobbs, R. (1999). The seven great debates in the media literacy movement.
Holley, L. C., Stromwall, L. K., & Bashor, K. E. (2012). Reconceptualizing Stigma: Toward
a Critical Anti-Oppression Paradigm. Stigma Research and Action, 2(2), Article 2.
https://doi.org/10.5463/sra.v1i3.46
Jones, E. E. (1984). Social stigma: The psychology of marked relationships. WH Freeman.
Jorgenson, D. (2019, April 11). Gillette posts photo of plus-size model and Twitter explodes.
WPLG. https://www.local10.com/lifestyle/2019/04/11/gillette-posts-photo-of-plussize-model-and-twitter-explodes/
Karasawa, K. (1995). Cognitive antecedents of emotions. Japanese Psychological Research,
37(1), 40–55.
Kleinman, A., & Hall-Clifford, R. (2009). Stigma: A social, cultural and moral process.
Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 63(6), 418–419.
https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2008.084277
Kleinman, Arthur. (1988). Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition. Basic Books.
Kleinman, Arthur, Das, V., Lock, M., & Lock, M. M. (1997). Social suffering. Univ of
California press.
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific
influences on judgement and choice. Cognition & Emotion, 14(4), 473–493.

139

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81(1), 146.
Lewis, J., & Jhally, S. (1998). The struggle over media literacy. Journal of Communication,
48(1), 109–120.
Link, B. G., Cullen, F. T., Frank, J., & Wozniak, J. F. (1987). The social rejection of former
mental patients: Understanding why labels matter. American Journal of Sociology,
92(6), 1461–1500.
Link, B. G., Cullen, F. T., Struening, E., Shrout, P. E., & Dohrenwend, B. P. (1989). A
modified labeling theory approach to mental disorders: An empirical assessment.
American Sociological Review, 400–423.
Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C. (2001). Conceptualizing Stigma. Annual Review of Sociology,
27(1), 363–385. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.363
Logie, C. H., James, Ll., Tharao, W., & Loutfy, M. R. (2011). HIV, Gender, Race, Sexual
Orientation, and Sex Work: A Qualitative Study of Intersectional Stigma Experienced
by HIV-Positive Women in Ontario, Canada. PLoS Medicine, 8(11), e1001124.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001124
Lyons, P. (2009). Prescription for harm: Diet industry influence, public health, policy, and
the obesity epidemic. In the fat studies reader (75-87). New York: New York
University Press.
Major, B., & O’brien, L. T. (2005). The social psychology of stigma. Annu. Rev. Psychol.,
56, 393–421.

140

Manokaran, R., Pausé, C., Roßmöller, M., & Vilhjálmsdóttir, T. M. (2020). ‘Nothing about
us without us’: Fat people speak. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 1–13.
McCall, L. (2005). The complexity of intersectionality. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society, 30(3), 1771–1800.
Mehta, N., Clement, S., Marcus, E., Stona, A.-C., Bezborodovs, N., Evans-Lacko, S.,
Palacios, J., Docherty, M., Barley, E., Rose, D., Koschorke, M., Shidhaye, R.,
Henderson, C., & Thornicroft, G. (2015). Evidence for effective interventions to
reduce mental health-related stigma and discrimination in the medium and long term:
Systematic review. British Journal of Psychiatry, 207(5), 377–384.
https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.114.151944
Meisenbach, R. J. (2010). Stigma management communication: A theory and agenda for
applied research on how individuals manage moments of stigmatized identity.
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 38(3), 268–292.
Morgan, A. J., Reavley, N. J., Ross, A., Too, L. S., & Jorm, A. F. (2018). Interventions to
reduce stigma towards people with severe mental illness: Systematic review and
meta-analysis. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 103, 120–133.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2018.05.017
Nath, R. (2019). The injustice of fat stigma. Bioethics, 33(5), 577–590.
O’keefe, B. J. (1988). The logic of message design: Individual differences in reasoning about
communication. Communications Monographs, 55(1), 80–103.
Organization, W. H. (2001). The World Health Report 2001: Mental health: New
understanding, new hope. World Health Organization.
141

Penn, D. L., Kommana, S., Mansfield, M., & Link, B. G. (1999). Dispelling the stigma of
schizophrenia: II. The impact of information on dangerousness. Schizophrenia
Bulletin, 25(3), 437–446.
Peters, E. M., Burraston, B., & Mertz, C. K. (2004). An emotion‐based model of risk
perception and stigma susceptibility: Cognitive appraisals of emotion, affective
reactivity, worldviews, and risk perceptions in the generation of technological stigma.
Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 24(5), 1349–1367.
Peters, E., & Slovic, P. (2007). Affective asynchrony and the measurement of the affective
attitude component. Cognition and Emotion, 21(2), 300–329.
Phelan, J. C., Link, B. G., & Dovidio, J. F. (2008). Stigma and prejudice: One animal or two?
Social Science & Medicine, 67(3), 358–367.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.03.022
Phelan, J. C., Link, B. G., Stueve, A., & Pescosolido, B. A. (2000). Public Conceptions of
Mental Illness in 1950 and 1996: What Is Mental Illness and Is It to be Feared?
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 41(2), 188–207.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2676305
Puhl, R. M., & Heuer, C. A. (2010). Obesity stigma: Important considerations for public
health. American Journal of Public Health, 100(6), 1019–1028.
Remedios, J. D., & Snyder, S. H. (2015). Where Do We Go From Here? Toward an Inclusive
and Intersectional Literature of Multiple Stigmatization. Sex Roles, 73(9–10), 408–
413. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-015-0543-4

142

Rocklage, M. D., & Fazio, R. H. (2015). The Evaluative Lexicon: Adjective use as a means
of assessing and distinguishing attitude valence, extremity, and emotionality. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 56, 214–227.
Rocklage, M. D., Rucker, D. D., & Nordgren, L. F. (2018). The Evaluative Lexicon 2.0: The
measurement of emotionality, extremity, and valence in language. Behavior Research
Methods, 50(4), 1327–1344.
Rothblum, E. D. (2018). Slim chance for permanent weight loss. Archives of Scientific
Psychology, 6(1), 63.
Services, U. D. of H. and H. (1999). Mental health: A report of the Surgeon General.
Sirgy, M. J. (1982). Self-concept in consumer behavior: A critical review. Journal of
Consumer Research, 9(3), 287–300.
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280–285.
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk as analysis and risk
as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality. Risk Analysis:
An International Journal, 24(2), 311–322.
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). Rational actors or rational
fools: Implications of the affect heuristic for behavioral economics. The Journal of
Socio-Economics, 31(4), 329–342.
Smith, R. A. (2007). Language of the Lost: An Explication of Stigma Communication.
Communication Theory, 17(4), 462–485. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682885.2007.00307.x

143

Smith, R. A. (2012). An experimental test of stigma communication content with a
hypothetical infectious disease alert. Communication Monographs, 79(4), 522–538.
Smith, R. A., Zhu, X., & Fink, E. L. (2019). Understanding the effects of stigma messages:
Danger appraisal and message judgments. Health Communication, 34(4), 424–436.
Solomon, M. R. (1983). The role of products as social stimuli: A symbolic interactionism
perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 10(3), 319–329.
Solomos, J. (2014). Stuart Hall: Articulations of race, class and identity. Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 37(10), 1667–1675.
Stangl, A. L., Earnshaw, V. A., Logie, C. H., van Brakel, W., C. Simbayi, L., Barré, I., &
Dovidio, J. F. (2019). The Health Stigma and Discrimination Framework: A global,
crosscutting framework to inform research, intervention development, and policy on
health-related stigmas. BMC Medicine, 17(1), 31. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916019-1271-3
Steadman, H. J. (1981). Critically reassessing the accuracy of public perceptions of the
dangerousness of the mentally ill. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 310–316.
Stuber, J., Galea, S., & Link, B. G. (2009). Stigma and smoking: The consequences of our
good intentions. Social Service Review, 83(4), 585–609.
Thompson, L., Pearce, J., & Barnett, J. R. (2007). Moralising geographies: Stigma, smoking
islands and responsible subjects. Area, 39(4), 508–517.
Tomiyama, A. J., Carr, D., Granberg, E. M., Major, B., Robinson, E., Sutin, A. R., & Brewis,
A. (2018). How and why weight stigma drives the obesity ‘epidemic’and harms
health. BMC Medicine, 16(1), 1–6.
144

Turan, J. M., Elafros, M. A., Logie, C. H., Banik, S., Turan, B., Crockett, K. B., Pescosolido,
B., & Murray, S. M. (2019). Challenges and opportunities in examining and
addressing intersectional stigma and health. BMC Medicine, 17(1), 7.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-018-1246-9
van Brakel, W. H., Cataldo, J., Grover, S., Kohrt, B. A., Nyblade, L., Stockton, M., Wouters,
E., & Yang, L. H. (2019). Out of the silos: Identifying cross-cutting features of
health-related stigma to advance measurement and intervention. BMC Medicine,
17(1), 13. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-018-1245-x
Xu, Z., Huang, F., Kösters, M., & Rüsch, N. (2017). Challenging mental health related
stigma in China: Systematic review and meta-analysis. II. Interventions among people
with mental illness. Psychiatry Research, 255, 457–464.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2017.05.002
Yang, Lawrence H. (2007). Application of mental illness stigma theory to Chinese societies:
Synthesis and new direction. Singapore Medical Journal, 48(11), 977.
Yang, Lawrence H., Chen, F., Sia, K. J., Lam, J., Lam, K., Ngo, H., Lee, S., Kleinman, A., &
Good, B. (2014). “What matters most:” A cultural mechanism moderating structural
vulnerability and moral experience of mental illness stigma. Social Science &
Medicine, 103, 84–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.09.009
Yang, Lawrence Hsin, Kleinman, A., Link, B. G., Phelan, J. C., Lee, S., & Good, B. (2007).
Culture and stigma: Adding moral experience to stigma theory. Social Science &
Medicine, 64(7), 1524–1535. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.11.013

145

